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The Future of Europe Lies in Waste:
The Importance of the Proposed
Directive on Civil Liability for Damage
Caused by Waste to the European
Community and Its Environmental
Policy
ABSTRACT

This Note suggests that waste issues provide valuable
insight into the European Community. As the Community has
developed more fully into a common market, the movement of
waste across national borders has caused concern in some
member states. Waste has flowed from states with more
restrictive environmental standards to those with less
restrictive standards. In some states, the perceived increase

in waste importation gave rise to public outcry for laws that
banned any further waste importation.
After illustrating the problems by discussing a waste
crisis in Belgium, this Note examines the European
Community's response to such problems. This study reveals
a trend in waste legislation that has allowed greater
restrictionson the movement of waste across the Community.
This Note suggests that the Community's legislative
responses to the perceived waste crisis are misguided.
Moreover, the mistakes of the legislative branch of the EC
have been compounded by the judicialarm of the Community,
the European Court of Justice. The Court has appeared
willing to allow member states to erect trade barriersbanning
waste importation in order to encourage each state to become
self sufficient with regard to waste disposal. As such, a
theory of environmental protection called the proximity
principle, which mandates the disposal of waste near its
source, has eclipsed one of the Community's founding
purposes-thefree movement of goods. These legislative and
judicial developments in environmental law threaten to
undermine the Community's ideals.
However, a recent Community proposal for legislation
might alleviate this threat. The European Commission has
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proposed a law that would impose civil liability for
environmental damage caused by waste. This law could
provide a uniform measure applicable across the Community
that would require polluters to pay for the environmental
damage that they cause. Though a good idea, this proposed
legislation has languished. This Note reasons that the
proposed liability law, with a few modifications, represents
the best means of promoting both sound environmentalpolicy
and the further development of the EuropeanCommunity.
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I. INTRODUCTION: SOMETHING'S ROTTEN INTHE
STATE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

By 1992, the people of Wallonia sensed that something was
rotten in the state of the European Community (Community or
EC).1 Across the continent, that year had been anticipated as a
significant milestone in European history. Five years earlier, in
1987, the Single European Act (SEA) mandated a host of legal
reforms that were to accelerate the development of a European
common market by 1992.2 Yet, in Wallonia, the southeastern
part of Belgium, residents noticed a dramatic increase in the
importation of a particular good-waste.
Several factors had transformed Wallonia into a magnet for
European waste. First, an overall shortage of landfill space in
Europe, a densely populated continent, had raised the costs of
waste disposal.3 These higher costs led corporations to search for
cheap, lawful disposal sites; in some states, the rising costs of
disposal led polluters to resort to unlawful dumping. 4 Second, by

1.
The 1992 Treaty on European Union, also known as the Maastricht
Treaty, has engendered some confusion regarding the proper name for the
supranational organization formed by the states of Europe. Under the Maastricht
Treaty, it is appropriate to refer to the European Union only when discussing
certain competencies set forth in the Treaty; in these new areas of power, the
term European Union should be used. Regarding all other powers, the older term
European Community is still appropriate. It is appropriate, for example, to refer
to the European Union with regard to matters of citizenship, common foreign and
security policy, as well as issues of justice and home affairs. The term European
Community should be used in the following areas: competition, company law,
environmental issues, banking, insurance, and the free movement of goods and
services. See CurrentDevelopments: Recent Legal Developments of the European

Communty, 4 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 189 n. 11 (1994). Some writers in the
area, however, have chosen to refer to the European Union after Maastricht, and
to reserve the term European Community for those acts that transpired before
Maastricht. See, e.g., Ethan T. James, Note, An American Werewolf in London:
Applying the Lessons of Superfund to Great Britain, 19 YALE J. INTL L. 349 & n. 4
(1994).
2.
SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter SEA]. See
generally,JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAW (3d ed. 1992).
3.
Patrick E. Thieffry & Peter E. Nahmias, The European Community's
Regulation and Control of Waste and the Adoption of Civil Liability, 14 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 949 (1991) (reporting that the EC generates 2000 million
tons of waste each year) (citing S.P. JOHNSON & G. COERCELLE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 185 (1981)); see, e.g., Paul Luiki & Dale
Stephenson, EuropeanCommunity Waste Policy:At the Brink of a New Era, 14 Intl
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 403 (July 17, 1991) (reporting that population density is a
major reason for the "drastic lack of disposal capacity within the EC").
4.
Bob Hagerty et al., Chemical Reaction: For People of Mellery, Waste
Dumping Issue Gains New Urgency, WALL ST. J. EUR., Feb. 15, 1991, para. 13
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the late 1980s, the European Community had established a

common market within which goods could travel freely across
national borders. Waste is such a good and, as such, as the
European common market became more developed, waste moved
Third, the laws of the
more freely across national borders. 5
member states regarding waste disposal varied considerably.
Although Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands have relatively
high environmental standards, the other member states have
established less demanding standards for environmental
protection. 6 Moreover, enforcement of environmental laws varies
among the member states. 7 To simplify, three general factors
have shaped the European market for waste: (1) an overall
shortage of landfill space in Europe has raised costs, which has
led to a search for cheap, lawful disposal sites and increased the
likelihood of unlawful dumping; (2) the removal of national
barriers to establish a European common market has allowed
waste from one country to be disposed in another; and (3) the
varied environmental standards of the member states made some
states more attractive than others as sites for waste disposal.
In addition to these general conditions within the European
market, internal developments in Belgium further contributed to
making the region of Wallonia a particularly attractive dumping
ground. Through the 1980s, the Belgian government transferred
powers from its federal center in Brussels to the regional seats of
power. 8 In the area of environmental regulation, some Belgian
regions moved slower than others. Wallonia adopted a laissez
faire approach to the environment. Among the effects of this
policy was to encourage a group of entrepreneurs to purchase old
sand quarries 9 for the purpose of filling these large pits with
waste and providing their operators with a quick source of
profits.' 0 The cumulative effects of these landfill operations and
Wallonia's laissez faire policies were devastating.

[hereinafter Hagerty, Urgency in Mellery]; see also L. Hencher & H. Sevenster,
Case Law, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 351, 352 (1993) (commentary by two
European professors on waste policy and a 1992 ruling of the European Court of
Justice).
Hencher & Sevenster, supranote 4, at 352.
5.
Hagerty, Urgency in Mellery, supranote 4, para. 8. See also Thomas W.
6.
Church & Robert T. Nakamura, Beyond Superjfund: Hazardous Waste Cleanup in
Europe and the United States, 7 GEO. INTL ENVIL. L. REV. 15 (1994).
Hagerty, Urgency in Mellery, supra note 4, para. 9. The Italian
7.
Environmental Ministry estimates that half of the industrial waste disposed of in
that country does not comply with its environmental standards. Id.
Id. para. 14.
8.

9.

Id. paras. 5,17.

10.

Id.
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The experience of Mellery, a village approximately thirty-five
kilometers south of Brussels, Belgium, vividly illustrates the
harmful effects of this waste trade. Nearby the village were a
number of sand quarries that a company had purchased for use
as landfills.
These sites became a "waste dumper's dream,
offering much lighter regulation and lower costs than Germany,
the Netherlands, and even the northern Belgian region of
Flanders." 11 As a result, the private landfills in their region had
become a dumping ground for waste from other parts of Belgium
and other European states. 12 The reportedly lax regulation and
comparatively low dumping costs in Wallonia resulted in a
massive inflow of waste from other regions. 13 This increase in
foreign waste precipitated significant environmental and health
problems. 14 According to one resident of Mellery, the region of
is
Wallonia had become the "garbage can of Europe."
By the mid-1980s, "convoys of waste-hauling trucks--many
of them from the Netherlands or Germany-began arriving at the
local dump." 16 By 1989, residents of Mellery complained that the
odors from the dumps were overwhelming.1 7 Although Wallonian
officials closed the dump two years later, by 1991 medical
diagnoses of the people of Mellery found considerable exposure to
toxins.' 8 The Belgian press reported to the country the sad tale of
the "Mutants in Mellery." 19 By one estimate, there are three
hundred to four hundred such dumps in Wallonia. 20
This
concentration of dump sites has exposed the people of Wallonia to
a "cocktail of poisons."2 ' The town and its residents have been
poisoned; their land has been spoiled, and their lifestyles
dramatically affected. To the people of Wallonia, something was
truly rotten about the European Community; its affect on their
quality of life had been striking and harmful.
Moreover, this influx of waste seemed particularly unfair to
the people of Wallonia, given the province's goal of becoming selfsufficient with regard to the processing and treatment of its own

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.para. 5.
Id.
Id. paras. 2, 12-20.
Id. paras. 3, 4, 14-19.
Id.
Id.para. 2.
Id.para. 3.
Id.
Id. para.4.
Id. para. 16.

21.

Id. para. 18 (quoting a spokesperson for Greenpeace Belgium).
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waste. Therefore, to stop the inflow of waste, the regional
government adopted a decree that prohibited, inter alia, the
other European states, as
importation of waste into Wallonia from
22
well as from other regions of Belgium.
While this decree addressed Wallonia's concerns, it seemed to
conflict with one of the primary goals of the European Community
-promoting
the free movement of goods across national
The tension between
boundaries without any restraints.
Wallonia's environmental concerns and the EC's economic goals
was apparent to the European Commission (EC Commission or
Commission), the executive branch of the European Community.
In 1992, the EC Commission challenged the validity of the
Wallonian decree. Under the EC Treaty, the Commission filed a

lawsuit with the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the supreme
judicial authority in the Community. In the case of Commission v.
Belgium (Belgian Waste Case),23 the ECJ upheld the Wallonian
The people of
decree against the Commission's challenge.
However, for the
Wallonia had won a substantial victory.
European Community-both as a litigant and as an ideal-the
case represented a damaging defeat. The reasoning of the Belgian
Waste Case allows individual member states to restrict the free
movement of a particular good through the European
Community. The Court, by upholding a law that established a
trade barrier on grounds of environmental protection, seemed to
invite environmental protectionism, or trade protectionism under
the guise of environmental protection.
This Note suggests that such perplexing waste issues are
significant to the future of the European Community.
The
legislative actions and judicial rulings surrounding the issue of
waste disposal reveal much about the present nature and the
likely future of the European Community. Part II of this Note
discusses the Community's waste policy and explains how the
proximity principle, the idea that waste should be disposed of
close to its source, has attained such prominence in waste policy
that it has eclipsed other principles that are supposed to guide
the Community's environmental policies. 2 4 Part III more fully

22.
Decree of the Walloon Regional Executive of 17 May 1983, § 5 (cited in
Case C- 2/90, Re Imports of Waste: EC Commission v. Belgium, [1993] 1 C.M.L.R.
365, Facts (1992) [hereinafter Belgian Waste Case].
23.
Belgian Waste Case, 1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1992).
24.
Aspects of the EC's waste policy have garnered a fair amount of
attention in law journals. Several sources provide a strong foundation on
LUDWIG KRAMER, FOCUS ON EUROPEAN
European environmental policy.
ENVIRONMENrTAL LAW (1992); E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, INTEGRATION THROUGH
LAW: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECIION POLICY (1985); Michael S. Feeley & Peter M.
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describes the Belgian Waste Case and the rulings of the European
Court of Justice on issues of environmental protection and free
trade. Part IV analyzes trends in European waste policy. It first
compares the jurisprudence of the ECJ with that of highest court
in a long-standing common market-the United States. 25 It then
examines a proposal to adopt legislation that would establish
civil liability for environmental damage caused by waste. This
proposed legislation would revive a buried principle in the
"2 6
Community's environmental law-the "polluter pays principle.

Gilhuly, Green Law-making: A Primer on the European Community, 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 653 (1991); Auke Haagsma, The European Community's
Environmental Policy: A Case Study in Federalism, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 311

(1989).
Numerous articles discuss aspects of the EC's waste policy. See, e.g., Andrew
Evans Skroback, Note, Even A Sacred Cow Must Live in a Green Pasture: The
Proximity Principle, Free Movement of Goods, and Regulation 259/93 on
TransfrontierWaste Shipments Within the EC, 17 B.C. INTL & COMP. L. REV. 85
(1994) (commenting favorably on the transfrontier shipment regulation, which
allows states to ban the importation of waste shipments); Jan H. Jans, Waste
Policy and European Community Law: Does the EEC Treaty Provide a Suitable
Frameworkfor Regulating Waste?, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 165 (1993); Nelson Smith, III,
The ProceduralImplementationProcess and a Model Substantive Approach Towards
the Storage, Treatmen4 and Disposal of Hazardous Waste in Western Europe, 13 U.
PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 354 (1992); Linda M. Sheehan, Comment, The EEC's Proposed
Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste: Taking Over When
Prevention Fails, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 405 (1991); George C. Freeman, Jr. & Kyle E.
McSlarrow, The Proposed EC Directive on Civil Liability for Waste-A Comparison
with the US Superfund Liability Regime, in CURRENT EC LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS: EC
ENVIRONMENTAND PLANNING LAW (David Vaughn, Q.C., ed., 1991); Alan C. Williams,
A Study of Hazardous Waste Minimization in Europe: Publicand Private Strategies to
Reduce Production of Hazardous Waste, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 165 (1987).
Coopers & Lybrand also provides a service tracking developments in EEC law.
See Coopers & Lybrand, EC Commentaries, Env't, § 9, Feb. 24, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur file [hereinafter Coopers & Lybrand Report].
25.
Far fewer articles have discussed the relevant jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice. See Damien Geradin, Free Trade and Environmental
Protectionin an Integrated Market: A Survey of the Case Law of the United States
Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice, 2 J. TRANSNATL L. & POLY 141
(1993); Jans, supra note 24, at 169-76 (briefly discussing the Belgian Waste Case
and concluding that the ECJ has helped to establish a sound waste policy).
26.
Since 1989, several articles have been written comparing proposed EC
legislation that would impose civil liability for environmental damage (the
Proposed Directive on Civil Liability for Environmental Damage Caused by Waste,
discussed infra Part IV), with the United States Superfund law. See, e.g., Ethan T.

James, Note, An American Werewolf in London: Applying the Lessons of Superfund
to Great Britain, 19 YALE J. INTL L. 349 (1994) (examining England's existing law
and the Community's proposed directive); Church & Nakamura, supra note 6;
Thieffry & Nahmias, supra note 3; Jonathan I.J. Goldberg, An Uncertain Future:
Retroactivity, Insurance, and the EC's Attempts at Environmental Liability
Legislation, 33 VA. J. INT' L. 685 (1993); Thomas R. Mounteer, ProposedEuropean
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Part IV concludes that this proposed legislation would assist the
Community in developing an environmental policy consistent with

its fundamental goal of ensuring the free movement of goods.
Part V recommends modifications to the EC's proposed liability
law that would ensure that the European Community does not
repeat some of the more egregious problems with analogous
United States legislation, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or
Superfund). This Note concludes that the proposed European
liability law offers the best hope for waste regulation in a manner
that preserves the Community's fundamental goal of ensuring the
free movement of goods and arrests the emerging trend of
environmental protectionism in the European Community.

II. THE COMMUNITY'S REGULATION OF A PECULIAR GOOD
Understanding the importance of the Proposed Directive to
the Community requires some knowledge of the structure of the
Community, as well as some understanding of its environmental
policies. The EC operates under several treaties: the 1957 Treaty
of Rome, the 1987 Single European Act, and the 1992 Treaty on
Although the
European Union (collectively, the EC Treaty).2 7
Treaty of Rome, which was adopted in 1957 to establish the
European Economic Community, did not address environmental

legislation based on
protection, the Community passed
provisions in the Treaty that called for the harmonization of laws
among the member states to promote the development

of a

common market. To accelerate the development of the common

Community Directive for Damage Caused by Waste, 23 ENVI. L. 107 (1993)
(comparing the Proposed Directive with CERCLA and discussing some of the
problems of adopting a liability law in the form of a directive); Michael S. Feeley,
et al., W~hfither Goes the ProposedDirective on Civil Liabilityfor Waste, 15 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 241 (1992) (describing the history of the Proposed Directive and
comparing it to an earlier 1989 proposal) [hereinafter W(hither the Directive]; Luiki
& Stephenson, supra note 3, at 411 (setting forth a table comparing the U.S. and
European law); Russell A. Klingaman, The European Community and Liability for
Cleaning Up Abandoned Hazardous Waste Sites: Should the EC Follow the United
States' Example? 9 WIS. INTL L.J. 125 (1990) (concluding that the EC should not
follow the example of the United States Superfund law).
To keep abreast of developments in the field, several services have been quite
useful. See, e.g., Luild & Stephenson, supranote 3, at 403 (discussing EC waste
policy and the proposed directive specifically).
27.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (1958)[hereinafter EEC TREATY]; SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, 1987 O.J. (L
169) 1 [hereinafter SEA]; TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, 31 I.L.M. 247
(1992)[hereinafter MAASIRICHT TREATY].
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market, member states adopted the Single European Act (SEA) in
1987. In addition to removing obstacles to the attainment of a
common market, the SEA expressly authorized the EC to legislate
in the field of environmental protection. 2 8
The increased
movement of goods following in the wake of the SEA's passage
included a rise in the transfer of waste over national borders.
While the increased traffic in most goods was embraced by
member states, the increase in "waste tourism,"2 9 or movement of
waste from one state to another, was not as well received. In
30
response to several highly publicized environmental disasters,
the Community adopted legislation that restricted the movement
of waste across the member states. Since the passage of the SEA,
EC legislation has consistently restrained the movement of waste.
These restrictions have been justified on the basis of the
"proximity principle"-a principle of environmental law that
appears in the SEA and urges the disposal and treatment of waste
close to its source. This Part concludes by suggesting that the
EC's obsession with the proximity principle has effectively buried
another principle that is supposed to guide Community
environmental policy. That other principle, the polluter pays
principle-and proposed legislation that would implement it-may
help the Community redirect its environmental policy, so that it is
consistent with the overarching goal of preserving free trade.
A. The Structure of the EuropeanCommunity

In the wake of the devastation of World War II, several
European leaders met to discuss the future of Europe. Instead of
perpetuating hostility among the states of Europe, their ideal was
3
to establish a common market in an atmosphere of cooperation. 1

28.
SEA, arts. 130(r)-(t); Hencher & Sevenster, supra note 4, at 352. The
authors reported a shift in the focus of EC waste policy after the passage of the
SEA from eliminating distortions in competition to a clearer emphasis on
environmental protection. The authors conclude "[t]his is undoubtedly a result of
fears about "waste tourism" [because ofl unrestricted free movement of waste as a
result of the abolition of border controls." Id. (citations omitted).
29.
Hencher & Sevenster, supranote 4, at 352.
30.
Whi)ither the Drectve, supra note 26, at 242-43 & nn. 7-9 (describing
transboundary harm caused in 1983 by a chemical plant in Seveso, Italy, as well
as harm caused to the Rhine by the Sandoz spill in 1986). These two incidents
brought considerable attention to the issue of the movement of waste and
dangerous substances across national borders in Europe. Id.
31.
STEINER, supra note 2, at 3. The initial drive for a European
Community was the result of interest in "international cooperation [that] had
been growing throughout the 20th century, and [that] was given particular
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In 1957, six states became parties to the Treaty of Rome (EEC
Treaty or Treaty of Rome), establishing the European Economic
Community. 3 2
The Community is a peculiar creature in
international law. It is a supranational organization; that is, one
that has been empowered by its member states with autonomous
institutions.
The member states have ceded power to the
Community to address those areas provided for in the Treaty.
The European Community is unique in the manner by which its
law "penetrates the domestic legal systems of member states, and
creates rights and obligations for individuals enforceable within
their national courts."3 3 Community law may come from one of
three sources: (1) the EC Treaty itself; (2) legislation adopted by
Community
institutions; or (3) rulings of the European Court of
34
Justice.
In general, the EC Treaty is a "framework treaty," which
establishes broad goals to be achieved and sets forth general
principles to be followed.3 5
It also establishes several
governmental bodies to draft legislation and to interpret the
Treaty's provisions. 3 6 The Treaty established an executive branch
(the European Commission), a legislative branch (the European
7
Council), and a judicial branch (the European Court of Justice).3
In addition, the Treaty established
a European Parliament as an
38
advisory body to the Council.
Since 1957, most of the Community's efforts have focused on
establishing a common economic market; however, even in its
origins in the Treaty of Rome, the Community sought to move
impetus in Europe following the devastation inflicted by the Second World War."
Id. See generally, D. LASOK & J.W. BRIGGS, LAW AND INSTITUIMONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, 3-17 (5th ed. 1991) (providing a summary of the background to the

EC).
32.

STEINER, supra note 2, at 5-6.

The original six members of the EC

were: Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands.

Six more have joined.

Denmark, Ireland and the United

Kingdom joined in 1973. Greece joined in 1979, and Spain and Portugal became

members in 1986. Id. Austria, Finland, and Sweden recently have become
members. See, e.g., Europe Opens Way to 3 New Members, N.Y. TIMES, March 2,
1994, at 11.
Significantly, in 1965, the member states reached an agreement that merged
three previously distinct entities that governed atomic energy, coal and steel, and
general economic matters. See Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single
Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 8, 1965, reprinted in 4 I.L.M.
776; STEINER, supranote 2, at 3-4.
33.
STEINER, supranote 2, at 5-6.
34.
Id.
35.
Id. at 5-7.
36.
Id. at7.
37.
Id. at 3-7, 9-19.
38.
Id. at 5-11.
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39
toward "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe."
Three major treaties serve as milestones along the path of the
Community's development of "an ever closer union:" the 1957
Treaty of Rome; 40 the Single European Act 41 (SEA) of 1987,
which amended the EEC Treaty in order to accelerate the
development of the common market; and the 1992 Treaty on
European Union 42 (Maastricht Treaty), which sets forth
comprehensive goals for the development of a more complete
political union.

1. Early Regulatory Efforts under the Treaty of Rome
The Treaty of Rome established the EEC, which had as its
goal, inter alia, "to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious development of economic activities." 4 a Since then,
the Community has attempted to secure the free movement of
persons,
and
services across
national
goods,
capital,
44
The Treaty of Rome expressly provides for the
boundaries.
removal of all national trade barriers, including numerical import
and export quotas, 4S as well as "all measures having equivalent
The "equivalent effects" provisions have been
effects."4

39.
EEC TREATY, pmbl.
40.
EEC TREATY. See also Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom), Mar. 25, 1957, 295 U.N.T.S. 259; Treaty Establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
SEA, 25 I.L.M. 503.
41.
42.
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992).
43.
EEC TREATY, art. 2. The article provides for the establishment of a
European Economic Community, having:
... as its task, by establishing a common market, and progressively

approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote
throughout the Community, a harmonious development of economic
activities, a continued and balanced expansion, and an increase in
stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer
relations between States belonging to it.
Id.
44.
EEC TREATY, arts. 9-11, 12-17 (requiring the elimination of customs
duties between member states); id. arts. 18-29 (establishing a common customs
tariff); id. arts. 20-37 (providing for the elimination of quantitative restrictions
between member states, and enumerating exceptions); id. arts. 67-73 (securing
the free movement of capital); id. arts. 48-49 (free movement of persons); id. arts.
59-66 (free movement of services).
45.
EEC TREATY, art. 30 (imports); id. art. 34.
EEC TREATY, art. 30 (imports), art. 34 (exports). The phrase "all
46.
measures having equivalent effects," includes "any measures which amount to a
total or partial restraint on imports... or goods in transit." STEINER, supranote 2,
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interpreted broadly to strike down any type of measure that might
impede trade among the member states. 4 7 However, Article 36 of
the EC Treaty limits the Treaty's provisions promoting free trade
by allowing for certain restrictions on trade as necessary for
48
human health or the protection of plants and animals.
To enact legislation necessary to achieve the Treaty's goals,
the Treaty of Rome empowered two governmental bodies of the
European Community, the European Commission and the
European Council. 4 9 The Community's legislation takes three
major forms: regulations, directives, and decisions. 50 Regulations

at 82 (summarizing Case 2/73, Riseria Luigi Geddo v. Ente Nazionale Risi). This
phrase has been "interpreted very generously (by the ECJ) ...
to include not
merely overtly protective measures or measures applicable only to imports or
exports ('distinctly applicable' measures), but measures applicable to imports (or
exports) and domestic goods alike (indistinctly applicable' measures), often
introduced . . . for the most worthy purpose.
Such measures range from
regulatory measures designed to enforce minimum standards, for example, of
size, weight, quality, price or content, to tests and inspections or certification
requirements to ensure that goods conform to these standards, to any activity
capable of influencing the behaviour of traders such as promoting goods by
reason of their national origin." STEINER, supranote 2, at 83.
47.
See STEINER, supra note 2, at 82-85. The European Court of Justice
has interpreted to this effect: "All trading rules enacted by member States which
are capable of hindering trade, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intraCommunity trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to
quantitative restrictions. Id. at 84 (summarizing Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v.
Dassonville, 1976, E.C.R. 497, 2 C.M.L.R. 436). For a more complete discussion,
see infra Part III (discussing the jurisprudence of the ECJ).
48.
EEC TREAIY, art. 36. Article 36 of the EC Treaty provides:
The provisions of Articles 30 to 36 shall not preclude prohibitions or
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of
public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health
and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures
possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a
disguised restriction on trade between member States.
EEC TREATY, art. 36.
49.
EEC TREAIY, art. 189.
These acts are referred to as "secondary
legislation."
50.
EEC TREATY, art. 189. Though generally beyond the scope of this Note,
a brief overview of the process for developing secondary legislation may be useful.
One author summarized the EC legislative process as follows:

The Commission (consisting of one or more representatives from
each Member State appointed to four-year terms) initiates legislation, and
also has the executive function of ensuring that Member States implement
EC legislation. The Parliament (consisting of MPs directly elected in
Member States) gives recommendations on Commission proposals before
the Council acts. The Council (consisting of ministers from Member State
governments) acts by adopting, altering (by unanimity) or rejecting
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are laws that become automatically binding in their entirety
across the Community.5 1 In contrast, directives are binding "as
to the result to be achieved."5 2 That is, directives set forth
general standards that member states must meet through their
own national legislation. Each individual state, however, may
determine how to implement the directive.5 3 Finally, decisions,
are issued by either the Council or the Commission and bind only
those entities (either member states or private companies) to
54
which they are addressed.

2. Environmental Protection under the Treaty of Rome
As adopted in

1957,

the Treaty of Rome contained

no

55
provisions expressly authorizing environmental regulation.
Absent express power to adopt such laws, the Community used
the trade harmonization provisions of the Treaty to legislate in
this field. 5 6 Specifically, the European Commission justified its
early environmental legislation on the basis of two broad
provisions drafted to ensure that the EC could achieve its goals:
Articles 100 and 235.5 7 Article 100 directs the European Council
to issue directives to promote harmony among the national laws

Commission proposals. The Single European Act strengthened the
participation of the Parliament in the legislative process by introducing the
"cooperation procedure" and also gives the Council the authority to adopt
legislation by qualified majority, which in effect means that no two
Member States can block legislation.
Luild & Stephenson, supranote 3, at 405 n.15. See generally STEINER, supranote
2, at 9-19.
51.
EEC TREAlY, art. 189. "A regulation shall have general application. It
shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States." Id.
52.
Id. "A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon
each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national
authorities the choice of form and methods." Id.
53.
Id.
54.
STEINER, supra note 2, at 38. The Council and Commission may also
issue "recommendations" and "opinions;" neither of these have any binding effect.
Id. at 38-39.
55.
Haagsma, supranote 24, at 319-323.
56.
The European Community has not been regarded as having any
powers beyond those clearly set forth in the EC Treaties. Superficially, this view
makes the current EC seem like the United States government; that is, one of
limited powers. Although the U.S. Constitution empowered Congress to regulate,
inter alia, interstate commerce, U.S. CONST. art. I., s. 8, cl. 3 (empowering
Congress to regulate interstate commerce), this power remained limited until the
twentieth century. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER
RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 127-29 (1992).
57.
STEINER, supranote 2.
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of the member states in order to promote economic development
and the establishment and operation of a common market.5 8
Article 235 is a broad "catch-all" provision that enables the
Council, acting unanimously, to take "appropriate measures" to
achieve the goals of the Community and the Treaty.5 9
The European Community first invoked these trade
harmonization provisions for the purpose of regulating the
environment in 1972.60 The following year, the EC promulgated.
its First Action Programme on the Environment. 6 1 As of 1993,
the Community had promulgated forty regulations and 196
directives regulating various activities that implicate an array of
environmental concerns. 62 However, these legislative efforts have

58.

EEC TREA'IY, art. 100. This Article reads:

The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission, issue directives for the approximation of such provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States as
directly affect the establishment or the functioning of the common market.
The European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee shall
be consulted in the case of directives whose implementation would, in one
or more member states, involve the amendment of legislation.
Id.

59.

EEC TREA,'Y, art. 235. This Article provides:

If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course
of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the
Community and this treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the
Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the commission and
after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.
Id.
60.
Declaration of the First Summit Conference of the Enlarged
Communities, cited in Programme of Action of the European Communities on the
Environment, Council Declaration, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) 1 (1973).
61.
Programme of Action of the European Communities on the
Environment, Council Declaration, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 112) 1 (1973). The
Community continued to act in this manner through four more programs. See
generally Continuation and Implementation of a European Community Policy and
Action Programme on the Environment, Council Resolution, 20 O.J. (No. C 139) 1
(1977) [hereinafter Second Environmental Action Program]; Continuation and
Implementation of a European Community Policy and Action Programme on the
Environment, Council Resolution, 26 O.J. (No. C 46) 1 (1983)[hereinafter Third
Environmental Action Program]; Continuation and Implementation of a European
Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment, Council
Resolution, 29 O.J. (No. C 328) 1 (1987)[hereinafter Fourth Environmental Action
Program].
62.
Jared Blumenfeld, 1994: The Year that Regional Environmental
Enforcement Gets Tough? An Analysis of NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement
and Maastricht Treaty, 16 Intl Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 959 (Dec. 15, 1993) (noting that
the EC has enacted a total of 445 legislative acts regarding environmental
protection).
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faced numerous obstacles to their effective implementation.
First, only a few member states have established their own
comprehensive environmental policy. 64 Second, because most of
this legislation has been promulgated through directives,
environmental policy is not entirely uniform across the
Community. Although directives set forth general principles and
goals, member states have some discretion in selecting the best
means of implementing the directive. Significantly, some member
states have resisted the idea of adopting Community
environmental policy through regulations
(laws imposed
uniformly on member states at the Community level). The
resistance to regulations has arisen, among other reasons,
because certain states that have established high environmental
standards are concerned that a regulation would reduce
65
environmental protection to the lowest common denominator.
Third, there is no clear policy regarding civil liability for
environmental damage in the Community. Each member state
has its own framework for making polluters pay for the damage
they cause. 66 Moreover, there are no economic incentives for
persons damaged to enforce the Community's environmental
legislation. 6 7 Finally, enforcement of EC directives has been a

63.
Enforcement responsibility lies with the Commission. Under Article
155 of the Treaty, it has responsibility that "the provisions of this treaty and the
measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied." EEC TRE7Y,
art. 155. It may investigate, EEC TREATY, art. 213, issue a reasoned opinion, and
if that does not suffice to effect compliance, may bring the matter before the ECJ.
EEC TREATY, art. 140.
64.
KRAMER, supra note 24, at 52. The author defines "environmental
policy" as 'a coherent... self-contained package of measures... designed with
the objective of protecting, preserving and improving the environment in all its
aspects. Id. According to Kramer, in 1991, only three states-Denmark, Holland
and Germany-had such environmental policies. France, the United Kingdom
and Luxembourg have some middle ground. Id. at 53. The other six Member
States-Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Belgium-lack a
comprehensive environmental policy; in these States, "measures for the
protection of the environment are generally taken for the purpose of implementing
in national law rules determined by the Community." Id. at 52-3.
65.
Haagsma, supranote 24, at 327 (referring to this phenomenon as the
"Danish problem"). Denmark often opposed proposals that threatened to lower
the environmental protection that its national laws imposed. Id. at 328.
66.
See, e.g., James, supra note 26 (discussing the environmental laws of
England); Church & Nakamura, supra note 6 (examining laws of the Netherlands,
Denmark, and Germany); Caroline London & Brizay London, Environmental
Liability Under the Laws of EC Member States, C764 ALI-ABA 255 (1992)
(discussing the laws of Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and
Italy).
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problem because there is not a developed technique for ensuring
68
member states comply with the directives.

3. Environmental Protection Becomes An Express Community
Goal Under the Single European Act of 1987
By 1987 European leaders perceived a loss of momentum in
their quest for a single European market. To accelerate the
development of such a market, the member states amended the
Treaty by adopting the Single European Act (SEA).69 Amid the
many provisions designed to achieve the overarching goal of
perfecting the common market, the SEA expressly made
environmental protection an explicit "objective" of Community
policy. 70 Accordingly, the SEA set forth several principles that
were

to

guide

the

Community's

established procedures

law.

71

environmental

for implementing

policy

and

these principles

into

The SEA integrated environmental protection into all other

Community policies.7 2 Accordingly, in taking any official action,
Community

institutions

were

to

consider

three

principles:

67.
See Richard Macrory, The Enforcement of Community Environmental
Laws: Some Critical Issues, 29 COMMON MKr. L. REV. 347 (1992). A "fundamental
characteristic of environmental law, both at Community and national level, is the
lack of readily identifiable vested interests willing and able to secure
enforcement." Id. (citations omitted). In other areas of law, a member state's

failure to implement Community law can directly affect economic interests. In
contrast, many "aspects of [the] environment are not susceptible to conventional
concepts of legal property rights which are capable of enforcement by private
interests." Macrory, supra,at 350.
68.
Blumenfeld, supra note 62; Cynthia Pollack Shea, European
Environmental Policy: Effects of the Single Market, 16 Intl Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 30
(Jan. 13, 1993) (quoting former EC Environment Commissioner who stated that
Member States "widely ignored" environmental directives).
69.
SEA.
70.
SEA, art. 130r(l). The SEA provided that:
Community policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of
the following objectives:
- preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment;
- protecting human health;
- prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources;
- promoting measures at international level to deal with regular or
worldwide environmental problems.
Id.
71.
The SEA introduced a new "Title" on the Environment consisting of
three articles, numbered 130r-t.
72.
As stated in the SEA, "[elnvironmental protection requirements shall
be a component of the Community's other policies." Id.
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prevention, proximity, and the "polluter pays." 73 The prevention
74
principle implores decisionmakers to take "preventive action."
The proximity principle requires states to make rectifying
environmental damage at its source a priority. 75 The polluter
pays principle simply states that the "polluter should pay" for
damage that it causes. 7 6 Each of these principles offers vague
admonishments to guide policymakers drafting environmental
legislation. None of them suggests any specific policy standards.
In addition to these guiding principles, the SEA lists a set of
considerations for the Community to examine in developing
policy. In making decisions regarding environmental law, the
Community must take into account the following: available
technology and scientific information; varying environmental
conditions in the Community; the costs and benefits of the
proposed measure; and the general economic and social impact of
the law on the Community as a whole and on the balanced
development of its regions. 7 7 While the SEA clearly set forth
these principles and considerations, how they translate into or
are incorporated in specific policies is less clear.
The SEA also expressly declared that individual member
states may adopt measures more stringent than those established
by Community policy. 78
For example, if the Community

73.
This provision, and all other sections of Art. 130r-t, remain intact as
part of the Treaty on European Union, reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 368 (1992).
74.
SEA, art 130(2). In the literature of public international law, this idea
has been referred to as the "precautionary principle." See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky,
The PrecautionaryPrinciple: Scientific Uncertainty and InternationalEnvironmental
Law, 85 ASIL PROC. 413 (1991). Though it generally suggests that policymakers
should consider the potential damage caused by contemporary activities, it does
not draw a line or establish a standard for evaluating when risk outweighs
current economic benefits.
75.
SEA, art 130(2).
76.
Id.
77.
EEC TREATY, art. 130r(3) (as amended by the SEA), explicitly provides
that:
In preparing its action relating to the environment, the Community
shall take account of:
(i)
available scientific and technical data;
(ii)
environmental conditions in the various regions of the
Community;
(iii)
the potential benefits and costs of action or of lack of action;
(iv)
the economic and social development of the Community as
a whole and the balanced developments of its regions.
Id. The Maastricht Treaty retains these provisions, but deletes the numbering.
78.
SEA, art. 130t provides:
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established a directive that allowed a certain level of groundwater
pollution, the Netherlands could set a more stringent level of
However, there is an
pollution controls for its waterways.
overarching limit on such laws. The member state may not
impede the Treaty's fundamental objective of securing the free
The tension between the SEA's
movement of goods.
environmental provisions, which allows states to enact
environmental laws that are more stringent than those of the
Community, and the Treaty's overall goal of a common market
remains problematic.
In practice, the translation of the environmental principles
set forth in the SEA into legislation has been particularly unclear
in the Community's waste policy. The Community established a
general regulatory framework for waste, known as the Community
The Waste
Waste Management Strategy (Waste Strategy).7 9
acts:80 a
legislative
four
through
implemented
been
Strategy has
8l
framework directive on non-hazardous waste, a similar directive
83
82
on toxic and dangerous waste, a third directive for waste oils,
84
The Waste
and a fourth for the transfrontier shipment of waste.
and
proximity,
prevention,
Strategy sets forth three objectives:

The protective measures adopted in common pursuant to Article
130s shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing
more stringent protective measures compatible with this Treaty.

Id. The Maastricht Treaty simply adds "Such measures must be compatible with
this Treaty. They shall be notified to the Commission." Haagsma, supranote 24,
at 336-37.
Communication from the EC Commission to the EC Council and to
79.
Parliament, a Community Strategy for Waste Management, SEC (89) 934 final
(1989) [hereinafter Waste Strategy]. For an extensive listing of the Community's
waste legislation, see Hencher & Sevenster, supranote 4, at 352 & n. 1.
See generally KRAMER, supranote 24, at 32-34.
80.
The Directive on Waste, Council Directive 75/442, 1975 O.J. (L 194) 39
81.
amended by Council Directive 91/156, 1991 O.J. (L 78) 32. This directive
contains general rules regarding disposal, id. art. 4; waste disposal plans, id. art
7; and permitting programs, id. art 9.
The Directive on Toxic and Dangerous Waste, Council Directive 78/319,
82.
1978 O.J. (L 84) 43, amended by Council Directive 91/689, art. 2, 1991 O.J. (L
377) 20. It contains similar rules for toxic and dangerous waste.
The Directive on the Disposal of Waste Oils, Council Directive 75/439,
83.
1975 O.J. (L 194) 23, as amended by Council Directive 87/101, 1987 O.J. (L 42)
43. These Directives prohibit certain discharges, id. art. 4; promote the safe
collection and disposal of waste oil, id. art. 3; and promote recycling, id.
The Directive on the Supervision and Control Within the European
84.
Community on the Transfrontier Shipment of Waste. Council Directive 84/631,
1984 O.J. (L 326) 31. Significantly, this directive was later amended. Council
Regulation 259/93, 1993 O.J. (L 30) 1. This directive requires notification of the
destination state for shipments, id. art. 3; mandates acknowledgments, id.; and
allows for objections and conditions, id. art. 4.
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recycling.8 5 Conspicuously absent is the polluter pays principle.
To achieve its goals, the Waste Strategy generally requires
operators in the waste industry to obtain permits and meet other
regulatory standards.8 6 The responsibility for enforcement of
environmental regulations rests upon the member states; national
authorities must implement the relevant directives. 8 7
In its
implementation, the "guiding principle" of the Waste Strategy has
been that disposal should be "carried out as near to the place of
production as possible, by means of adequate technology and the
highest possible level of protection for the environment and for
health."8 8
In effect, the proximity principle has become the
beacon guiding the Community in the development of its waste
policy.
The heightened importance of the proximity principle in EC
legislation seems linked to the accelerated development of the
common market and fear of the consequences of waste flowing
freely through the Community.89 The adoption of the SEA in
1987 was driven by an interest in removing the remaining
economic barriers to a common market by 1992. The removal of
these obstacles has been accompanied by an increased traffic in
transboundary waste. This increased traffic in waste has been
accompanied by more frequent cries of "NIMBY," or "not in my

backyard." The rise of the "internal market" has given rise to a
"widely voiced fear... that reduced border controls and increased
goods transport will result in more trade of ...
waste."90 This
heightened concern has resulted in more frequent invocation of
the proximity principle. 9 1 By focusing on the proximity principle,
Europeans hope to deter waste tourism, the travel of waste from
one state to another, and to prevent the transformation of less
affluent member states into Community-wide dumping grounds.
Ironically, the environmental protection provisions of the SEA-a

85.
Jans, supranote 24, at 173.
86.
Thieffry & Nahmias, supranote 3, at 956-960.
87.
Id.
88.
Coopers & Lybrand Report, supra note 24, § 9.1.
The Council's
favorable comment on the Strategy appears in a Resolution, O.J. C/122 (1990).
For a general summary of the Strategy, see Coopers & Lybrand Report, supra note
24, § 9.2
89.
Hencher & Sevenster, supranote 4, at 352.
90.
Shea, supranote 68.
91.
Id. The author relates the concern expressed at a meeting of the
Council of Ministers on October 20, 1992. At that meeting an agreement was
reached 'that every country can keep out foreign waste by systematic rejection or
by legislation adopted for environmental reasons." Id.
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law that was motivated primarily by an interest in perfecting the
common market- have been invoked to establish trade barriers.
4. As the Member States Assume Treaty Obligations Aspiring to
Political Union, Community Waste Policy Reveals Reservations

a. The Treaty on Political Union (Maastricht Treaty)
Through the late 1980s, the member states discussed
measures that would move them closer toward a political union,
such as the completion of the economic union (including the
adoption of a common currency), the development of a common
foreign policy, and a common defense policy. 9 2 In 1992, EC
leaders met in the Belgian city of Maastricht to sign the Treaty on
European Union. Among the issues addressed by the Maastricht

Treaty was the inextricable link between economic development
93

and environmental preservation.
The Treaty reaffirmed that EC environmental policy was to be
guided by the principles of prevention, proximity, and the
"polluter pays." Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty amended Article
130r(2) in a manner that heightened the sense of urgency about
It expressly declared that the European
the environment.
Community "aims to provide a high level of [environmental]
protection." 9 4 To achieve that goal, advocates may invoke the
95
increased enforcement powers of the European Court of Justice.

92.
93.
1992), 31
TREAY].

STEINER, supranote 2, at 5.
EEC TREATY (as amended by the TREAY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7,
I.L.M. 247 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter MAASTRICHT
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union entered into force on

November 1, 1993. The dates of ratification for the twelve Member States follow:
Belgium (December 10, 1992), Denmark (June 6, 1993), France (November 4,
1992), Germany (October 13, 1993), Greece (November 3, 1993), Ireland
(November 23, 1992), Italy (December 5, 1992), Luxembourg (August 28, 1992),
Netherlands (December 28, 1992), Portugal (February 16, 1993), Spain
(December 31, 1992), and the United Kingdom (August 8, 1993). The provision
referring to sustainable development is Article 2. EEC TREAY, art. 2 (as amended
by the Treaty on European Union).
94.

EEC TREATY, art. 130r(2), para. 1.

95.

MAASTRiCHTTREATY, art. 171(2). This enforcement provision states:

If the member state concerned fails to take the necessary measures
to comply with the Court's judgment within the time limit laid down by the
Commission, the latter may bring the case before the Court of Justice. In

so doing it shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment
to be paid by the member state concerned which it considers appropriate

in the circumstances. If the Court of Justice finds that the member state

564

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 28:543

Significantly, the Maastricht Treaty enables the European
Commission to sue a member state for damages for failure to
comply with any rulings of the Court. The Maastricht Treaty also
allows a member state to impose more stringent environmental
96
standards than the Community.
Despite this invigorated commitment to the environment, the
Maastricht Treaty also contains a number of provisions intended
to alleviate the burden that this higher level of protection places
upon the member states. It expressly provides that, in pursuit of
its commitment to a high level of protection, the EC will take into
account "the diversity of situations in the various regions of the
Community."9 7 To implement this "differentiation" policy, which
recognizes geographic and economic differences among the
member states, the Maastricht Treaty provides two safety
valves. 98 First, the Treaty allows "temporary derogations" 99 from
Community environmental policy. Second, the Treaty suggests

financial support from a fund established by the member states,

called the "Cohesion Fund." 100

These two safety valves are

intended for temporary use, to assist a particular member state in

concerned has not complied with its judgment, it may impose a lump sum
or penalty payment on it.

Id.
96.
Art. 130t provides: "The protective measures adopted pursuant to Art.
130s shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more
stringent protective measures. Such measures must be compatible with this
Treaty. They shall be notified to the Commission." Id.
97.
Id. art. 130r(2) para. 1. "Community policy on the environment shall
aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the
various regions of the Community. Id. (emphasis added). The Maastricht Treaty
clarifies the meaning of such consideration in the following paragraph: "In this
context, harmonization measures answering these requirements shall include,
where appropriate, a safeguard clause allowing Member States to take provisional
measures, for non-economic environmental reasons, subject to a Community
inspection procedure. Id. art. 130r(2) para. 2.
98.
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, art. 130s(5). This article provides:
Without prejudice to the principle that the polluter should pay, if a
measure based on the provisions of paragraph 1 involves costs deemed
disproportionate for the public authorities of a Member State, the Council
shall, in the act adopting that measure, lay down appropriate provisions in
the form of:
- temporary derogations and/or
- financial support from the Cohesion Fund to be set up no later
than 31 December 1993 pursuant to Article 130d.
Id.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
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adjusting to Community standards in a manner that will not
cause an undue financial or social burden upon its businesses or
people.
b. The Transfrontier Shipment Regulation
Under the Maastricht Treaty, the Community's waste policy
has continued to emphasize the proximity principle. Indeed, in
the wake of the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, which was
intended to move the member states toward "an ever closer
political union," the Community's waste policy illustrated the
continued importance of state territorial boundaries. Rather than
facilitating the free movement of waste through a common
market, the Community appears to have increased its reliance on
the proximity principle.
This development could be seen most clearly in the 1993
Regulation on the Supervision and Control Within the European
of Waste
Shipment
the Transfrontier
on
Community
(Transfrontier Shipment Regulation).101 This Regulation, which
superseded an earlier directive, establishes a system that allows
member states to object to a particular shipment of waste in order
to protect their state's environment, public health, or safety.l° 2 A
member state may "prohibit generally or partially ... shipments
of waste for disposal." 10 3 As such, the Transfrontier Shipment
Regulation authorizes such actions in order to allow member

states "to implement the principles of proximity, priority for
recovery and self-sufficiency at Community and national
As such, the Transfrontier Shipment Regulation
levels." 1° 4
represents the legislative perfection of the proximity principle. It
transforms the long-standing Community preference for this
principle into a powerful tool by which member states may bar
the importation of waste from other member states. Ultimately,
the Regulation could allow member states to erect impenetrable
trade barriers to waste. This result hardly seems consistent with

101.
Council Directive 84/631, 1984 O.J. (L 326) 31, as amended by
Council Regulation 259/93, 1993 O.J. (L 30) 1 [hereinafter Transboundary
Shipment Regulation]. The Regulation requires notification of the destination
state for shipments, id. art. 3; mandate acknowledgments, id.; and allow for
objections and conditions, id. art. 4. The 1993 Regulation incorporates the Basel
Convention on the'Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste,
March 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention] into
Community law. See Skroback, supranote 24 (concluding that this Regulation is
a desirable solution that does not "unfairly abuse" the ideal of a common market).
102. Transboundary Shipment Regulation, supra note 101, pmbl.

103.
104.

Id. art 4(3)(c).
Id. pmbl., art. (3)(b)(i).
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the idea of a common market, which guarantees the free
movement of goods across national borders.1 0 5
Under this
Regulation, waste in the European Community has become a
peculiar good, one that does not benefit from the general rules
regarding the common market.
Yet, it should be noted that the Community's Transfrontier
Shipment Regulation reflects a developing trend in international
law.10 6 In fact, the Regulation was specifically adopted in order to
implement the European Community's 1993 ratification of the
Basel Convention on the Transboundary Shipment of Hazardous
Wastes (Basel Convention).' 0 7 The Basel Convention generally
charges states to dispose of their own waste within their
territorial boundaries.' 0 8 The only exception to this overarching
principle arises when environmental concerns of a particular state
require transboundary movement of waste.1 0 9 The Community's
ratification of the Basel Convention was consistent with its
emphasis on the proximity principle as the primary guide for its
Waste Strategy. 1 10 Cumulatively, the Basel Convention and the
Community's internal Waste Strategy reflect strong support both

105. See Pierre V.F. Bos, The Proposed Regulation on the Supervision and
Control of Movement of Waste:
Some Comments, in CURRENT EC LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS: EC ENVIRONMENr AND PLANNING LAW 158-64 (David Vaughn, Q.C.,

ed. 1991).
106. See Sean D. Murphy, Prospective Liability Regimes for the
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 88 AMi. J. INTL L. 24, 33-36
(1994).
107. Basel Convention, supra note 101, art. 4, § 2(d).
108. Id.
109. Id. "There should be no free movement of waste, unless there are
environmental reasons to decide otherwise."
110. Jans, supra note 24, at 173. The Directive, as amended, provides that
member states are obliged:
• . . to establish an integrated and adequate network of disposal
installations, taking account of the best available technology not involving
excessive costs. The network must enable the Community as a whole to
become self-sufficient in waste disposal and the Member States to move
towards that aim individually, taking into account geographical
circumstances or the need for specialized installations for certain types of
waste. The network must also enable waste to be disposed of in one of the
nearest appropriate installations, by means of the most appropriate
methods and technologies in order to ensure a high level of protection for
the environment and public health.
Id. at 172 (quoting Council Directive 91/156, art. 5, 1991 O.J. (L 78) 34).
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in the Community and globally for disposing of waste close to the
place where it is generated."'
While the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty was viewed as an
important milestone on the way to the development of a political
union in Europe, the debate regarding waste and environmental
protection more generally reveals how difficult the further
strengthening of such a union will be. Viewed narrowly, waste
may just be an issue that falls outside the scope of the
Community's overarching goal of maintaining a common market.
Viewed more broadly, however, the problems arising with the
movement of waste across national borders may reveal the limits
of any union in Europe. Specifically, while the member states are
willing to cooperate on a host of economic matters, they are far
more reluctant to surrender their sovereignty on issues that pose
potential negative ramifications for them or seem to encroach on
their vital interests as sovereign states. Waste disposal has
proven such an issue.
B. Has the 'PolluterPays"PrincipleBeen Buried?
While Community legislation has been preoccupied with the
proximity principle, another principle that appears throughout
Community treaties and legislation-the polluter pays principlehas been buried. The belief that the polluter should pay for
damage it causes has long been mentioned in the Community's
environmental policy. The polluter pays principle has appeared in
every Community environmental programme since the first in
More significantly, it appears in both the Single
1973.112
4
However,
European Act" 3 and the Treaty on European Union."
or
despite regular mention of this principle, no treaty, directive,
s
programme offers any guidance for its implementation."

111. See generally Hugh J. Marbury, Global Waste Exportation: The Global
Manifestation of Environmental Racism, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 251 (1995)

(discussing this global trend and related issues of eco-racism).
112. First Action Programme, O.J. 1973, No. C 112/1, pt. I, tit.II, no. 5.
This provision states "The cost of preventing and eliminating nuisances to the
environment must in principle be borne by the polluter. However there may be
certain exceptions and special arrangements . . . provided that they cause no

significant distortion to international trade and investment." Id.
113.

SEA, art 130r(2).

114. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, art. 130r(2).
115. Dr. Ludwig Kribner, The 'Polluter Pays" Principle in Community Law:
The Interpretation of Article 130r of the E.E.C. Treaty, in FOCUS ON EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 244, 258 (1992) [hereinafter Kr~imer, PolluterPays] (stating
that the particular method of legislation necessary to implement the polluter pays
principle cannot be deduced from the principle itself). Significantly, individual
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The only development of this concept by any Community
organ-other than a proposal for liability legislation that has
languished since 1989 (which, is the focus of Part IV of this
Note)-appears in a 1975 Council Recommendation, an official
document without binding legal force." 6 This Recommendation
explores the meaning of the polluter pays principle and

emphasizes its importance.

Above all else, it urges that

implementation of the polluter pays principle is necessary to avoid
trade distortion"1 7 and to promote environmental protection. 1 18

By charging polluters for the costs of the environmental damage
they caused, the principle would create an economic incentive for
them to reduce their pollution output. 119 This market incentive
would encourage a "more rational use" of the Community's
environmental resources. 120 The Recommendation also concludes
that implementing the polluter pays principle would not offend
1 1
the Community's deeply rooted notions of fairness.
The Recommendation stresses the importance of applying the
polluter pays principle uniformly throughout the Community in
22
order to avoid distortions of competition and trade.'
Specifically, the Recommendation would require polluters to pay

member states have developed laws that sketch out some meaning to this
principle. See Church & Nakamura, supranote 6.
116. Council Recommendation Regarding Cost Allocation and Action by
Public Authorities on Environmental Matters, 1975 O.J. (L 194) 1 [hereinafter
Recommendation].
The Council Recommendation records the favorable
consideration of the European Council on a Communication from the
Commission to the Council Regarding Cost Allocation and Action by Public
Authorities on Environmental Matters: Principles and Detailed Rules Governing
Their Application, 1975 O.J. (L 194) 1 annx. The Commission Communication is
annexed to the Recommendation. For clarity, both documents are referred to
collectively as the "Recommendation."
117. Recommendation, supranote 116, pmbl. para. 8.
118. Id.
119. Id., annx. princ. 1, para. 2.
120. Id. The phrase "more rationale use" of environmental resources
sounds consistent with the increasingly important notion of "sustainable
development." See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1, June 13, 1992, reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992). The EC
is a party to the Rio Conventions.
121. Recommendation, supra note 116, princ. 1, para. 2.
122. Id. princ. 1, para. 3 provides:
In order to avoid distortions of competition affecting trade and the
location of investments which would be incompatible with the proper
functioning of the common market, the costs connected with the
protection of the environment against polluters should be allocated
according to the same principles throughout the Community.
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for the costs of measures necessary to eliminate or reduce
pollution to levels established by member states. 123 Interpreting
this Recommendation narrowly, the polluter pays principle just
requires polluters to pay for the costs of complying with
environmental legislation adopted by the Community and its
member states. Complementing this proposition, the principle
also means that environmental protection should not primarily

depend on public subsidies or grants. In short, the burden of
cleaning up pollution should rest not on the Community or
member states, but rather on the individual polluters. 124 Those
polluters must pay fines or penalties for failing to comply with
environmental standards. 125 Notably, this Recommendation does
not interpret the polluter pays principle as necessarily requiring
the imposition of civil liability for damage caused by waste, an
approach used by the United States and discussed more fully in
Part W.B. 1.
issue
of
While
the
Recommendation
leaves
the
implementation somewhat vague, it serves two useful purposes:
(1) it defines "polluter" and suggests a chain of persons to pursue
for payment; and (2) it lists permissible exceptions to the
enforcement of the polluter pays principle. First, a "polluter" is
defined broadly as "someone who directly or indirectly damages
the environment or who creates conditions leading to such
damage." 126 This definition suggests responsibility for pollution
will be defined broadly. The Recommendation also suggests a
policy for seeldng payment when a polluter cannot pay. In such
cases, "the cost of combating pollution should be borne at the
point in the pollution chain... and by the legal or administrative
means which offer the best solution from the administrative and
economic points of view and which make the most effective
For
contributions toward improving the environment." 12 7
example, if there are several causes of the pollution, the
Costs could be
Recommendation suggests two strategies. 128
assessed at a point in the pollution chain where the "number of
" 12 9
economic operators is least and control is easiest.
Alternatively, costs could be charged "at the point where the most

123.
Id. annx. princ. 2.
124.
Id. princ. 2, para. 2.
125.
Id. princ. 4 (stating that "standards and charges . . . are the major
instruments of action available to public authorities for the avoidance of
pollution) (emphasis added).

126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. princ. 3.
Id. princ. 3, para. 2.
Id.
Id. princ. 3, para. 3.
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effective contribution is made towards improving the
environment, and where distortions to competition are
avoided."' 30 These two suggestions offer guidance for a state
trying to determine who to charge for the costs of remedying

environmental damage caused by pollution.

The first formula

focuses on defming a manageable group of identifiable polluters

who could be charged for the costs of remedying environmental
damage, while the second suggests keeping an eye on the best
interests of the environment and trade policies. Both are still
vague, but they provide at least some direction for the
implementation of the polluter pays principle.
The Recommendation also suggests certain exceptions to the1
3
enforcement of a policy based on the polluter pays principle.'
First, an exception might be warranted if the immediate
application of stringent environmental standards would pose
substantial economic costs on a company that could result 1 in
32
social harm (such as a loss of jobs) within a particular state.
In such cases, polluting companies may be given more time to
conform to the new standards; alternatively, the member state or
the Community might set a higher standard and provide financial
aid to noncomplying companies for a limited period of time.1 3 3 A
second exception would allow a member state to grant subsidies
for favored sectors of its economy.1 4 The Community generally
has prohibited such pollution subsidies in the area of
environmental protection because they relieve the polluter of the
costs and pass them on to taxpayers. Nonetheless, if a new
stringent environmental regulation threatens to cause substantial
harm to a significant industry, a member state may seek an
exemption to give that industry time to adapt a reasonable
strategy, while still somewhat alleviating the environmental
problem.
The Community has broad discretion to determine the best
means of implementing the polluter pays principle in its
secondary legislation. 13 5 Yet, to date, the practical effect of this

130.

Id. princ. 3, para. 3.

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. princ. 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. princ. 6(b) (allowing an exception for "industrial, agricultural or

regional structural problems").

This exception would seem flexible enough to
environmental protection to fall on

allow a considerable amount of the burden for
the taxpayers.

135. See KRAMER, supra note 24, at 257-58. "The legislature has a free
hand as to the shaping of the legal provisions." It has considerably leeway in its
choice of method, whether a public fund, a system of strict rather than fault-
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principle had been unclear. 136 Some commentators have noted
that the principle remains dormant because it is not tied to an
adequate risk-based, market incentive. 13 7 Others claim it is not
pragmatic. 138 Regardless, one thing that is clear is that the
polluter pays principle remains untried in Community legislation.
Other than in the 1975 Recommendation, the Community had
not examined, developed, or implemented the meaning of the
polluter pays principle. In sharp contrast, the legislation enacted
by the political entities of the Community has been guided
foremost by the proximity principle.
To summarize, the Community's legislative and executive

branches have demonstrated a strong preference for the proximity
principle as a guide for waste policy. Before the adoption of the
Transfrontier Waste Regulation in 1993, the Community Waste
Strategy emphasized the importance of the proximity principle;
with the adoption of that Regulation, the Community's reliance on
the proximity principle expressly allowed a member state to
impair the free movement of goods. These political developments
raised an important question regarding the development of the
Community: Would the European Court of Justice, which was
empowered as the final arbiter of matters arising under the
Treaty, invalidate the environmentally restrictive law adopted by
the Council as contrary to the goals of the Community? Would
the Court allow laws based on the proximity principle to restrict
the free movement of waste across national borders? The Court
answered these questions in the Belgian Waste Case.
based liability, or imposing compulsory insurance. Id. Further, it also must
wrestle with the issue of apportionment, and whetherit should be borne by one
polluter or split among them. Id.
136. Id. at 253. Dr. Kramer suggests that the polluter pays principle means
that:
Community action in environmental matters shall proceed on the
basis that the costs for the removal of damage that has occurred to the
environment where existing legal provisions have not been adhered to is in
principle to be borne by the emittor of the pollution. The burden of such
costs shall only be borne by the general public in exceptional
circumstances. Exceptions may be formulated differently for various
regions.
Id.
137. Smith, supra note 24, at 394 (implying that the principle has failed
because it has not been attached to a market-based incentive). As a remedy,
Smith suggests that "new methods which incorporate appropriate market based
incentives so as to encourage companies to monitor their hazardous waste output
should be developed." Id. at 395.
138. Id. (claiming that the principle is flawed because "the polluter may not
be the cause of the problem"). Like the preceding criticism, however, this
difficulty does not render the principle fatally flawed.
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III. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE BURIES A FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLE OF TiE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

As discussed in Part I of this Note, a region in eastern
Belgium responded to a perceived waste crisis by barring any
future importation of waste. When the Belgian Waste Case arose
before the European Court of Justice in 1992, the European

Community's waste policy clearly emphasized the proximity
principle. Several directives regulating the movement of waste
showed a policy preference for the proximity principle. However,
at that time, the Community had not yet become a party to the
Basel Convention; nor had it adopted the Transfrontier Shipment
Regulation.
Nonetheless, the proximity principle guided
Community waste policy. The 1992 ruling of the European Court
of Justice (Court or ECJ) in the Belgian Waste Case would further
entrench this principle in Community policy. The case was a
harbinger of trouble for the Community; it illustrates why the
future of Europe lies in waste.
Before discussing the Belgian Waste Case, however, this Part
provides a brief overview of the role of the European Court of
Justice in the European Community. Then, it examines the
development of the Court's jurisprudence in the field of
environmental law.
Generally, the Court has become more
tolerant of environmental protectionism as the common market
has become more fully developed. This Part concludes that this
trend is deleterious to the ideals of the European Community.
A. The European Court of Justice and Its Early Environmental
Jurisprudence
The European Court. of Justice is the highest authority with
139
regard to the "interpretation and application" of the EC Treaty.
Its interpretation of the EC Treaty and secondary legislation are
supreme. 140 The laws of the individual member states, including
their constitutions, may not conflict with ECJ rulings. 14 1 Among

139.

140.
8,023.

EEC TREAIY, arts. 164-68; See generally STEINER, supranote 2, at 18.

Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

141. Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. at 593. Costa v. ENEL set forth the Court's
definitive statement on the nature of the Community's power:
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of
representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real
powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers
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the sources of law upon which the ECJ may rely are the EC
Treaty, secondary legislation passed by Community organs, and
general principles of law common to the member states. 142 While
the Court "seeks to achieve consistency in its judgments, its
Thus, the Court
precedents are not binding" upon it. 143
interprets each case before it in light of the spirit of the EC
Treaty. 14 4
Examining the role of the ECJ in environmental protection
reveals several interesting themes. First, between the adoption of
the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the SEA in 1987 (when
environmental protection was not expressly within the scope of
the Community's powers), the ECJ invoked the trade

harmonization provisions of the EC Treaty (Articles 100 and 235)
145
to uphold early environmental legislation.
After the adoption of the SEA, which expressly authorized the
Community to legislate with regard to environmental protection,
the ECJ invoked general principles of law to uphold member
states' environmental regulations against attack by Community
organs on grounds that they were contrary to the free movement
of goods.
The jurisprudence of the Court during these two
periods provides significant background for the Belgian Waste
Case, which expressly upheld a member state's law that raised a
barrier to the import of waste.

from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields.
The reception, within the laws of each member State, of provisions
having a Community source, and more particularly of the terms and of the
spirit of the Treaty, has as a corollary the impossibility, for the member
State, to give preference to a unilateral and subsequent measure against a
legal order accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity ....
The transfer, by member States, from their national orders in favour
of the Community order of the rights and obligations arising from the
Treaty, carries with it a clear limitation of their sovereign right upon which
a subsequent unilateral law, incompatible with the aims of the
Community, cannot prevail.
Id. For an interesting discussion of the conflict between the laws of the European
Community and one member state (Ireland), see Anne M. Hilbert, The Irish
Abortion Debate, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 1117 (1994) (discussing the tension
surrounding the abortion issue in Irish and Community policy).
142.
STEINER, supra note 2, at 18, 21.
143.
Id. at 18.
144.
Id.
145.
See discussion supra part II (regarding the use of Articles 100 and 235
to justify early EC environmental legislation).
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1. Early Cases Establishing Environmental Protection as a Valid
Community Objective
Before the SEA made environmental protection an express
Community goal in 1987, the ECJ upheld several early
environmental laws against challenges that the Community
lacked authority to adopt such legislation. For example, in 1980
Italy challenged an EC directive that established environmental
standards for biodegradable detergents. Italy argued that the
Community lacked authority to adopt such legislation.
In
Commission v. Italy, the ECJ upheld the EC directive based on the
Treaty of Rome's trade harmonization provisions, Articles 100 and
235.146 The ECJ reasoned that environmental protection was a
valid field for Community legislation.
The alternative-if the Community could not adopt a uniform
law-would be that the member states could adopt varying
standards.
For example, the Netherlands could establish
stringent environmental standards for the disposal of detergents,
while Spain accepted much lower standards.
Given such a
disparity, companies would have a greater economic incentive to
dispose of detergents in Spain because it would cost less to meet
its standards than those of the Netherlands.
Over time, this
economic incentive to send detergent to Spain would create a
market distortion; that is, Spain would seize an economic
advantage over the other member states because of its "race to
the bottom" to establish the least demanding environmental
standards for detergent disposal. Only uniform, Community-wide
standards could prevent such market distortion and ensure fair
competition. Commission v. Italy suggests that the ECJ would not
allow the member states to distort trade through their individual
environmental laws.
This ruling was consistent with the ECJ's role as guardian of
the common market. As the final arbiter of the meaning of the
Treaty, the ECJ heard numerous cases regarding national laws
that allegedly conflicted with the goal of a common European
market. In its rulings, the ECJ regularly invalidated quantitative

146. Case 91/79, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1099. The ECJ upheld
a challenge to Council Directive 73/404, regarding the biodegradability of
detergents. Rejecting Italy's argument that the directive exceeded the scope of the
Community's competence, the Court clearly ruled that environmental protection
was a valid field of legislative action. In its words, environmental laws "may be a
burden upon the undertakings to which they apply and if there is no
harmonization of national provisions on the matter, competition may be
appreciably distorted." Id. at 1106.
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restrictions on trade, as well as "measures having equivalent
effect to quantitative restrictions." 14 7 The Court interpreted the
Treaty broadly as invalidating: "[a]ll trading rules enacted by
member States which are capable of hindering, directly or
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade. . . ."148
The Court appeared served as a guardian of the internal market.
However, the Court diverged from its earlier jurisprudence in
the 1979 case of Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltungfur
Banntwein (Cassis de Dijon).14 9 In Cassis de Dijon, the Court held
that national laws will not breach the Treaty if they are necessary
to satisfy "mandatory requirements," or important state
policies.1, 0 In such cases, the Court would analyze the national
law under the "rule of reason."1 s l Under this analysis, a law had
to employ means that were no more than necessary to protect a
state's interest.1 5 2 Before Cassis, a law had to be justified upon
the grounds set forth in Article 36 of the Treaty (either necessary
for the public health, safety, or morality). After Cassis, laws that
incidentally burdened interstate commerce were analyzed under
the rule of reason, a general balancing test. 153
In 1985, the ECJ suggested another justification for allowing
restraints on trade. Its ruling in Procureurde la Republique v.
ADBHU'5 4 suggested that environmental protection could justify

certain restraints on trade. In ADBHU, the Court ruled that free
trade could not be "viewed in absolute terms." To the contrary,
certain Community objectives were sufficiently important that
free trade.' 5 5
they could justify legislation restricting

147.
STEINER, supra note 2, at 83.
148.
Id. (citations omitted). Interestingly, the jurisprudence of the ECJ
paralleled that of the United States. State laws that were facially discriminatory
(referred to as "distinctly applicable" measures by the ECJ) were per se invalid. In
contrast, those that applied equally to imports and domestic goods (called
"indistinctly applicable" measures) were analyzed under a balancing test similar
to that used by the U.S. Supreme Court. Compare id. with Pike v. Bruce Church,
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
149. STEINER, supra note 2, at 85-86 (discussing Case 120/78, ReweZentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 599).
150. Id.
151.
Id.
152.
Id. at 87.
153. Id. at 86. Whether facially discriminatory laws were subject to the
Cassisrule was left unclear.
154.
Case 240/83, Procureur de la Republique v. ADBHU, 1985 E.C.R. 531,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,164. The ECJ upheld Directive 75/439, regarding
the disposal of waste oils.
155. Id. at 549, 12, Common Mkt. Rep (CCH) 14,164, at 15,993.
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Environmental protection was one such objective. 1 5 6 Therefore,
EC institutions could legislate in the field of environmental
protection, even though these laws might impede the free
movement of goods. Vindicated by these rulings, the European
Commission7 adopted legislation addressing specific environmental
15
problems.
Significantly, Commission v. Italy and ADBHU stand for the

proposition that the EC has the power to legislate in the field of
environmental protection even though such laws might restrain
trade. Both of these cases involved legislation by the Community
and not national laws of individual member states. The ECJ
viewed EC laws as necessary for the Community. In its early
environment rulings, the Court only allowed Community
measures to restrict trade; as yet, it had not allowed a member
state to restrain trade through an environmental protection law.
2. Using General Principles of Law to Uphold Increasingly
Protectionistic Environmental Laws

In the wake of the SEA's passage, the ECJ allowed member
states to impose more stringent environmental standards. It did
so by invoking general principles of law. 158 General principles of
law are those rights commonly incorporated in the constitutional
traditions of the member states.1 5 9 In 1988, the ECJ invoked the
principle of proportionality to uphold heightened environmental
standards adopted by the state of Denmark. 160
In short,

156. Id. at 549, 13, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,164, at 15,993.
157. Thieffry & Nahmias, supranote 3, at 956.
158. The legal basis for incorporating such principles is based on three
Articles. STEINER, supra note 2, at 55. Article 173 gives the court power to review
the legality of Community acts on the basis of inter alia any "infringement of this
Treaty," or "any rule of law relating to its application." EEC TREATY, art. 173.
Article 215(2) provides that the Community's tort liability shall be determined "in
accordance with general principles common to the laws of the Member States."
EEC TREATY, art. 215(2). Article 164 provides that the ECJ "shall ensure that in
the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed." EEC
TREATY, art. 164. Finally, as one commentator noted: "respect for fundamental
rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the
Court." STEINER, supra note 2, at 56 (summarizing Case 11/70, Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255).
159. Id. See also TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, art. F. "The Union shall
respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the member

States as general principles of Community law." Id.
160.

STEINER, supranote 2, at 58, 60, 86.
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proportionality requires that the means used to achieve a

particular end must not exceed what is necessary and appropriate

to achieve that end. 16 1 The ECJ has interpreted this principle as
establishing a test requiring a regulating entity to "justify its
actions" and consider alternatives. 162 Derogation is permissible if
"justified" on one of the grounds listed in the Treaty. For a
derogation to be justified, the measure must be "no more than is
necessary" to achieve a particular goal. 16 3 In the context of
environmental law, the proportionality principle requires "the aim
of protecting the environment, or the health and life of humans,
by the means least
animals, and plants, [to] be achieved 64
restrictive" of trade within the Community. 1
The leading case on proportionality is the 1988 Danish Bottle
Case, in which the ECJ reviewed the validity of a Danish recycling
law. 165 The law established a deposit-and-return system for
bottle recycling and required foreign manufacturers to submit
their container designs for review by Danish authorities. 16 6 The
European Commission challenged this system as a violation of
Article 30 of the Treaty, which prohibits restrictions on imports.
Denmark defended its law on the ground that it was an
acceptable derogation under Article 36 of the Treaty, which allows
67
derogation when necessary to protect human health.'
Moreover, Denmark asserted that its law was proportional to the
goal of environmental protection.
The Court regarded the deposit-and-return provision of the
Danish law as compatible with Article 30 of the EC Treaty.' 68
The deposit system was a "necessary" and "indispensable" part of
the Danish recycling program.16 9 Therefore, the Court ruled that
to the extent that the Danish law restricted the free movement of
goods, it was proportional to the environmental goals of

161.

Id. at 58, (citing Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH,

[19701 E.C.R. 1125).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Jans, supra note 24, at 71. See, e.g., ADBH, 1985 E.C.R. at 549 (a
directive providing means by which member states may dispose of waste oil does
not restrict trade in violation of Community law principles); Danish Bottle Case,
1988 E.C.R. at 4629 (Danish law more restrictive of imports than necessary).
165. Geradin, supranote 25, at 183 (citing DanishBottle Case, 1988 E.C.R.

4607).
166. Id. (citing 1988 E.C.R. at 4629).
167. EEC TREAaY, art. 36. See supra note 48 (setting forth text of this
provision).
168. Geradin, supra note 25, at 184 (citations omitted).

169.

Id.
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Denmark. 170 A separate provision requiring Danish approval of
foreign bottles, however, was disproportionate to the goal of
environmental protection and, therefore, incompatible with the
17 1
Treaty.
In the Danish Bottle Case, the ECJ seemed to ignore the
discriminatory effects that the Danish program had on nonDanish recyclers. 172
This ruling is at odds with the free
movement of goods and the EC Treaty, which allows trade
restrictions only when a state's rules apply equally to domestic
and imported products. 173
The Court avoided that issue,
however, and focused solely on the inquiry into proportionality. 17 4
By characterizing the Danish deposit system as "proportionate,"
the Court allowed a rather high level of environmental protection
to impede the free movement of goods. 175

As such, the Danish

Bottle Case expanded the scope of permissible derogations under
Article 36 to include those measures necessary for the protection
of the environment.176 In so doing, the ECJ ruled that a law was
"proportional" to the goal of environmental protection even though
17 7
it placed a greater burden on imports than domestic goods.
Although the ECJ has interpreted the relation between
several general principles of law (such as proportionality) and the
EC Treaty, it has never ruled on the meaning of the polluter pays
principle.
The environmental jurisprudence of the ECJ
conspicuously lacks any discussion of the polluter pays principle,
despite the fact that this principle is supposed to guide EC
environmental law. Although this principle appears in the EC

Treaty and environmental programmes, no case has arisen before
the ECJ that has resulted in a ruling on the actual meaning of
the polluter pays principle or a statement regarding its actual
meaning or weight relative to other principles guiding EC
8
environmental law.17
Nonetheless, the ECJ has clearly established the meaning of
general principles of law that are not expressly set forth in the

170. Id.
171. Id. at 185.
172. Id. ("even though on the surface the measures were indiscriminately
applicable to Danish and non-Danish manufacturers, the Danish measures
applied a heavier burden on the latter") (citations omitted).
173. Id. (citations omitted).
174. Id.
175. Id. (citations omitted).
176. Jans, supranote 24, at 168 n. 37.
177. Id. See also Pascale Kromarek, Environmental Protection and the Free
Movement of Goods: The Danish Bottle Case, 2 J. ENVT'L L. 89 (1990).
178. Haagsma, supra note 24, at 339-340.
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Collectively, the absence of any
Treaty, like proportionality.
rulings on the polluter pays principle and the Court's
interpretation of general principles of law have provided fertile soil
for the seeds of environmental protectionism.
B.

The Belgian Waste Case: The Proximity Principle Trumps the
Free Movement of Goods

However,

the

early

jurisprudence

of

the

ECJ

on

environmental protection never threatened the fundamental EC
goal of guaranteeing free trade as directly as the Court did in
Commission v. Belgium [Belgian Waste Case].1 7 9 As discussed
briefly in Part I, the people of Wallonia, Belgium, had ample
reason to be concerned about the significant increase in waste
disposal within their borders. Wallonian outrage created political
pressure, which led the regional government of Wallonia in 1987
to ban any future importation of waste from outside of its borders.
While this ban somewhat alleviated the concerns of the people of
Wallonia, it disturbed the European Commission, which viewed
the ban as contrary to the fundamental principles of Community
law.
Thus, the Commission brought an action before the ECJ
claiming that Belgium18 0 had failed to fulfill its obligations under
In the
applicable waste directives i s i and the EC Treaty.182
decree.
Wallonian
the
reviewed
Court
the
Belgian Waste Case,
The Advocate General (AG),1 s 3 an attorney appointed to serve as a

179. Case C- 2/90, Re Imports of Waste: EC Commission v. Belgium, [1993]
1 C.M.L.R. 365 (1992) [hereinafter Belgian Waste Case]. This case offers ample

opportunity for comparison with the United States' Supreme Court ruling in City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see Geradin, supranote 25.
180. Under the EC Treaty, the state is held liable for the action of its
regional governments. See e.g., Case C-21/88, duPont de Nemours Italia SpA v.
Unita Sanitoria Locale No. 2 di Carrara (holding that there are no "grounds for
distinguishing between national measures which produce purely regional effects
and regional measures having the same effects) cited in Belgian Waste Case, supra
note 179, "Written Replies," § c.
181. The Commission asserted that Belgium had violated both Council
Directive 75/442 (regarding disposal, plans and permits for waste) and Council
Directive 84/631 (regarding the transfrontier movement of hazardous waste).
Belgian Waste Case, supranote 179, First Opinion of the AG, para. 1.
182. The Commission also asked the Court to declare Wallonia's ban a
failure by Belgium to fulfill its obligations under Articles 30 and 36 of the EC
Treaties. Id.
183. An attorney appointed to serve as a permanent amicus curiae for the

ECJ, as provided for in the EC Treaty. EEC TREMY, arts. 166-67. The role of the
AG is to assist the Court by presenting detailed analysis of all relevant issues of
fact and law, as well as recommendations to the Court. These recommendations
are not always followed. However, when the Court follows the AG's opinion, it is
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permanent amicus curiae for the ECJ, framed the discussion
aptly.
Because the Wallonian decree applied only to nonhazardous waste, it was outside the scope of the Community's
existing regulatory scheme at the time for non-hazardous
waste; i 8 4 however, the ban did violate the directive on hazardous
85
waste. 1
The AG then focused on whether the ban violated the free
movement of goods protected by the EEC Treaty. 18 6 The AG
reasoned that waste is a good and, therefore, its movement
should not be impeded.1 8 7 Because the free movement of waste
fell under the protection of Article 30 of the EC Treaty, Belgium
needed to justify its law either under Article 36 (allowing
derogations for threats to human health), or the "mandatory

requirements" exception to Article 30 (which analyzed indistinctly
applicable measures, those applying equally to domestic and
foreign goods, under the rule of reason test). First, the AG stated
that the Article 36 human health exception "must be interpreted
restrictively."' 8 8 The AG did not accept Belgium's argument1 8 9
that its law was necessary as an "urgent and temporary safeguard
S..to prevent Wallonia [from] becoming the 'dustbin of
Moreover, because the Wallonian ban clearly
Europe." 190
discriminated against foreign waste, it was not appropriate to
analyze it under the more permissive "rule of reason" standard
used for indistinctly applicable measures. 19 1 As such, the AG
concluded that the EC Commission had established that Belgium
breached its EC Treaty obligations regarding the free movement of
goods. 1

useful for understanding the reasoning underlying the Court's decision. STEINER,
supra note 2, at 18. The Court's decisions themselves are often short, providing
little reasoning. Id.
184. Belgian Waste Case, supranote 179, First Opinion of the AG, para. 8.
185. Id. paras. 9-12.
186. EEC Treaty, arts. 30, 36.
187. Belgian Waste Case, supra note 179, First Opinion of the AG, para. 16.
The AG expressly rejected the Belgian argument that waste was not a "good"
because it had "no intrinsic commercial value." Id. The AG concluded that
"objects which are transported over a frontier in order to give rise to commercial
transactions are subject to Article 30, irrespective of the nature of these
transactions." Id.
188. Id. para. 20.
189. Id. para. 15.
190. Id. para. 20.
191. Id.
192. Id. paras. 20-30.
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The Court agreed with the AG that waste was a good, 1 9 3 but
it disagreed with the AG's conclusion that the Wallonian law was
discriminatory. The Court suggested that the nature of waste
might warrant special consideration. 1 94 The Court noted that
"waste has a special characteristic." 195
Moreover, "[tihe
accumulation of waste, even before it becomes a health hazard,
constitutes a threat to the environment because of the limited
capacity of each region or locality for receiving it."19 6 The Court
accepted the Belgian government's claim that an "abnormal,
massive influx of waste" into Wallonia constituted a "genuine
threat to the environment" in light of the area's "limited
19 7
capacity."

Based on these concerns, the Court took a peculiar analytical
turn. Rather than analyzing the facially discriminatory law under
the Article 36 standard, the Court examined the law under the
"mandatory requirements" exception which was normally reserved
for indistinctly applicable measures. 198 The Court stated that to
determine if a law was discriminatory "the particular type of
waste must be taken into account." 19 9 This statement is a non
sequitur. Having determined that waste was a good, the Court
should have determined whether the law was facially
discriminatory or "indistinctly applicable." Instead, the Court
developed a new line of reasoning.
To support its peculiar analysis, the Court noted the
Community's reliance on the principles of proximity and selfsufficiency in EC waste policy, 2 ° ° referring specifically to these
2°
20
principles in the EC Treaty ' and the Basel Convention. 2

Belgian Waste Case, supra note 179, Decision of the Court, para. 30.
193.
More directly, the Court held that "waste, whether recyclable or not, should be
regarded as a product [,] the movement of which must not in principle, pursuant
to Article 30 EEC, be impeded." Id.
Id. para. 32.
194.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. para. 36.
199. Id.
200. Id. paras. 36-37; see Jans, supra note 24, at 170 (declaring this
reasoning a "surprisingly new approach").
201. Belgian Waste Case, supra note 179, Decision of the Court, para. 36
(citing EEC Treaty, art. 130r(2)).

202. The reference to the Basel Convention was peculiar. Hencher &
Sevenster, supra note 4, at 362-63. According to Hencher and Sevenster, the
Transfrontier Shipment Regulation, which was just in draft form at the time,
would allow "Member States to restrict substantially the transfer of wastes, [but]

would not tolerate an absolute ban." Id. at 363. The Court later addressed this
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Moreover, the Court acknowledged the EC's general policy that
measures
each region or local political division "take appropriate
"20 3
to receive, process[,j and dispose of its own waste.
Preoccupied with the importance of self-sufficiency regarding
waste, the Court failed to confront the inconsistency in its logic.
Instead, the Court concluded that "having regard to the
differences between waste produced in one place and that in
another and its connection with the place where it is produced,
the contested measures cannot be considered
discriminatory. "2 °4 The emphasis on the proximity principle in
Community treaties and legislation caused the Court to view
waste as a good that should be disposed of near the place where it
was generated.
Thus, the Community's obsession with the
proximity principle blinded the Court to the fact that waste is a
good, and its movement should not be restricted.
The Belgian Waste Case upheld Wallonia's ban on the
importation of foreign, non-hazardous waste by ruling that it was
a permissible trade barrier. Somehow, the nature of waste
transformed an import ban from a trade barrier that seemed to
violate a fundamental EC principle into a permissible law.20 5
Moreover, the Belgian Waste Case elevated the proximity
principle, a concept specifically applicable to environmental
protection, over a fundamental tenet of the Community-the free
movement of goods. 20 6 For years, the proximity principle had
influenced the shape of EC waste policy.2 0 7 The EC strengthened
its embrace of this principle by signing the Basel Convention in
1989 and adopting the Transfrontier Shipment Regulation to
implement the Basel Convention in 1993.20
However, the
proximity principle had never before fully eclipsed the

issue in the Waste Regulation Case, see infra part III.C (suggesting that a complete
ban was justifiable).
203. Belgian Waste Case, supra note 179, Decision of the Court, para. 36.
204. Id. para. 38. The Court's holding is limited to the effect of the
Wallonian Decree on non-hazardous waste, absent any specific provision
regarding transboundary movement of such waste in Directive 75/442 (regarding
non-hazardous waste). Id. para. 39.
205. Id. para. 38. The Court did rule that Belgium "failed to fulfill its

obligations" under a Directive that regulated the movement of hazardous waste.

Id. Specifically, prohibiting the dumping of hazardous waste from another state
conflicted with Council Directive 84/631 (regarding the transboundary movement
of hazardous waste). Id.
206. See Jans, supranote 24, at 172-73.
207. See supra part II (discussing EC waste policy).
208. See supra part II (discussing the Basel Convention, and Transfrontier
Shipment Regulation).
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commitment to the freedom of the
Community's fundamental
20 9
movement of goods.
While the EC Treaty allows derogations for limited
purposes, 2 10 the Belgian Waste Case marked the "first time" that
the Court upheld a "trade restriction facially discriminating
against imports."2 1 1 The key to the Court's ruling appeared to lie
in the phrase "having regard to the differences between waste
2 12
The nature of
produced in one place and that in another."
Treaty. The
the
by
unprotected
good
a
waste transformed it into

Belgian Waste Case failed to examine the Wallonian decree under
general principles of law applicable in the European Community.
Specifically, the Court did not undertake the proportionality
analysis that it applied in the Danish Bottle Case. If the
Wallonian decree had been analyzed under the proportionality
test, the decree would have had to achieve its environmental goal
by the means least restrictive of trade.2 1 3 More importantly, the
Belgian Waste Case contradicts one of the fundamental principles
2 14
of the European Community-the free movement of goods.
Now, absent applicable Community legislation, a member state
may impose restrictions on the waste trade if they are necessary
to protect the environment. 21 5 While the Belgian Waste Case is
consistent with the trend in Community legislation emphasizing
the importance of self-sufficiency through the proximity principle,
the Court failed to explain how waste could be a good and yet not

Cf. Jans, supra note 24, at 173 (suggesting that the Belgian Waste
209.
Case represents a conclusion by the ECJ that the Basel Convention's reliance on
the proximity principle does not contradict the EEC Treaty's protection for the free
movement of goods).
210. EEC TREA'IY, art. 36. Under Article 36 of the Treaty, a restriction on
trade shall not "constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination . . . on trade
between Member States."
Geradin, supra note 25, at 194.
211.
212. Belgian Waste Case, supranote 179, Decision of the Court, para. 38
213. Jans, supra note 24, at 171-2 (commenting that the Court's failure to
consider the proportionality principle seemed a "remarkable omission").
Cf. Geradin, supranote 25, at 190. The author states:
214.
The particular nature of waste appears, however, as rather a weak
justification. It does not have the precision necessary to ensure legal
certainty, and therefore it opens the door to potential abuse. The principle
of correction at source, as included in Article 130r(2) of the Treaty, and the
principles of proximity and self-sufficiency, developed in the Basel
Convention, offer little additional support to the ECJ. Indeed the Court
mentioned these principles without questioning in any way their
compatibility with the Maastricht Treaty.
Id.
See supra notes 179-205 and accompanying text
215.
Belgian Waste Case).

(discussing the
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warrant the protection generally afforded goods. The Court also
did not explain why any restriction on the movement of waste did
2 16
not merit scrutiny under the proportionality test.
C.

The PolluterPays PrincipleForgotten:
Parliament v. Council, 1994

In 1994 the European Court of Justice reviewed another
dispute relating to the issue of waste. Although the case focused
on the procedure used by the Community institutions in
developing environmental policy, European Parliament v. Council

[Waste Regulation Case]217 revealed the continued dominance of
the proximity principle in the Community's waste policy.
Moreover, the Waste Regulation Case reaffirmed that the EC will
not encroach on the political decisions of individual states
regarding their waste policies.
In the Waste Regulation Case, the European Parliament
sought to annul the Transfrontier Shipment Regulation, which
was adopted by the European Council in 1993 to implement the
Basel Convention. 2 13 The Parliament expressed greater concern
regarding the procedure by which the Regulation was adopted
than with its substantive provisions. Parliament claimed that
such legislation could only be adopted under Article 100a of the
EC Treaty (regarding trade harmonization), which requires a more
complex
"cooperation"
procedure
that
involves
greater
participation of the European Parliament.2 19 Council, in contrast,
claimed that it adopted the Regulation under Article 130s

216. This case raises important questions about the role of the ECJ. One
commentator, comparing the role of the ECJ with the United States Supreme
Court, suggested that:

Courts have a very important, although limited role to play. Their
decisions have mainly a corrective effect: they can only strike down
obstacles to trade in an integrated market. The duty falls on the federal or
Community legislator to adopt coherent environmental policies based on
harmonized standards that are protective of the environment.
Geradin, supranote 25, at 196.
217. European Parliament v. Council, Case 187/93, reprinted in FINANCIAL
TIMES, July 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, Inflaw Library, ECCASE file [hereinafter

Waste Regulation Case].
218. Id., Opinion of the AG, para. 1 (setting forth the opinion of the
Advocate General).
For a more thorough discussion of the Transfrontier
Shipment Regulation, see suprapart I.

219.

Id. para. 2.
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(regarding environmental policy), which only requires the Council
22 0
to consult the Parliament.
The Court examined the Regulation and ruled in favor of the
European Council, holding that the law was based on Article 130s
of the Treaty. 22 1 Under Article 130s, the Council was only
required to consult the Parliament and did not need its
cooperation. 2 22 Under the Waste Regulation Case, a law adopted
with a view toward environmental protection could be justified
entirely by Article 130s.2 2 3 The fact that such a law might affect
the internal market was not sufficient to invoke Article 100a (the
trade harmonization provision of the Treaty).2 2 4 Once more, the
Court invoked the proximity principle, as though simply
mentioning the idea explained everything-including its avoidance
of the clear conflict with the Community's ideal of ensuring free
2 25
trade.
There are two ways to interpret the Waste Regulation Case.
One is to view the Court as deferring to Council's judgment on
Community-wide waste policy.2 2 6 The Waste Regulation Case
could be interpreted as establishing a principle that the EC
organs, because they represent the entire community, may
impede trade within the common market.
Though this
interpretation holds some appeal, the Belgian Waste Case
suggests that the ECJ will also allow member states to
unilaterally ban the import of waste.
The Court's ruling in the Waste Regulation Case revealed the
key role played by the proximity principle in the Community's
Waste Strategy.
Moreover, this case also reinforced the
perception that there is not a common market for waste, but
rather a system of individual member states, each of which can
bar the import of waste from other member states. Finally, the

220.
Waste Regulation Case, supranote 217, Decision of the Court, para 16.
221. Id. paras. 23-30.
222.
Id. para 23.
223. Id. para 22-25.
224.
Id. para 25.
225.
Id. para 20-23.
226. This narrow view of the ruling is analogous to the U.S. Congress
passing a law that allows states to regulate a particular activity even though such
laws may restrain interstate commerce. See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTTUnONAL LAW 275 (4th ed. 1991). Two examples of such laws
regard those governing the insurance and banking industries. In the United
States, the rationale justifying such interference with interstate trade is that
Congress, which represents the entire nation's interests, can best determine what
is best for the common market. If it allows some restraint on interstate

commerce, that is acceptable. In the United States, the Commerce Clause only
restrains the states.
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opinion noted that the Wallonian decree upheld in the Belgian
Waste Case was an example of a measure that was compatible
2 27
with the EC Treaty.
The Belgian Waste Case and Waste Regulation Case raise
significant questions about the role of the ECJ in the Community,
especially with regard to the protection of the free movement of
goods. The Belgian Waste Case threatens to allow member states
to enact laws that raise barriers to trade under the guise of
environmental protection. 2 28 Such a result is inconsistent with
the goal of establishing a common market.

IV. ANALYsIs

This Part analyzes the judicial rulings of the ECJ and the
legislation of the European Council and Commission. First, this
Part suggests that the ECJ should examine the free trade
jurisprudence of the most long-standing common market, the
United States.
Not surprisingly, the United States has
encountered litigation much like that which arose in the Belgian
Waste Case. The very different result reached by the U.S.
Supreme Court may offer a guide to the ECJ in its role as
guardian of the European common market. Second, this Part
examines a 1989 proposal by the EC Commission for legislation
that would impose civil liability for environmental damage caused
by waste. This proposal would revive the polluter pays principle
and establish a better waste policy, which would be consistent
with the Community's overall goal of securing a common
European market. After describing this proposed legislation, this
Part discusses the reluctance in Europe to adopt such an
environmental liability law. Part IV then concludes with an
explanation of the current status of the Proposed Directive.

227.
Waste Regulation Case, supra note 217, Opinion of the AG, para. 21.
See also Hencher & Sevenster, supra note 4 (reaching a similar conclusion about
the effect of the Belgian Waste Case).
228.
But cf. Betsy Baker, Protection, Not Protectionism: Multilateral
Environmental Agreements and the GATT, 26 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 437 (1993)
(suggesting that the tension between environmental protection and economic
protectionism is not irreconcilable).
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A. Toward a Simpler Jurisprudenceof Free Trade: Looking to the
United States for ComparativeInsight
As the world's most long-standing common market, the
United States offers a useful comparative study for the European
Community. However, any comparison of the United States and
the European Community must acknowledge the fundamental
differences between them. When the United States became an
independent nation, it consisted of thirteen modestly developed
colonies.
In contrast, the member states of the European
Community are densely developed countries with advanced
technologies, different cultures, and centuries of political history
and conflict among themselves. Even this simplistic comparison
suggests vast differences between the two entities. Simply stated,
there were far fewer obstacles for the United States to form a
common market and political union than there are for the
member states of the European Community. 22 9 Nonetheless, the
European Community, particularly the ECJ, may benefit from
examining the role of the United States Supreme Court in
preserving a common market.
In order to promote the development of a common market,

the United States Constitution limits the states in their regulation

of interstate commerce.

Specifically, the Commerce Clause,

which is phrased as empowering the U.S. Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, 23 0 has been interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court as imposing a significant limitation on state
regulation in this area.2 3 1 The judicial doctrine embodying this

229. Although this comparison is cursory, any broader discussion is beyond
the scope of this Note. As one article stated: "The Community is not a recast
version of the United States, needing to fine tune its interpretation of federalism.
Rather it is a supranational organization [that] strives to forge consensus among
very different Member States in a unique political context." W(h)ither the Directive,
supranote 26, at 282.
230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause provides: Congress shall have
the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes."
231.
For one of the most eloquent statements of the theory underlying
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, see H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S.
525 (1949). In that case, Justice Jackson stated:
The Commerce Clause is one of the most prolific sources of national power
and an equally prolific source of conflict with legislation of the state.
While the Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate commerce
among the states, it does not say what the states may or may not do in the
absence of congressional action. /Perhaps]even more than by interpretation
of its written word, this Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of
this Nation by the meaning it has given to these great silences of the
Constitution. [The] principle that our economic unit is the Nation, who alone
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limitation, known as the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,
remains a very real check on state powers in the late twentieth
century.

23 2

In general, there are two different standards for analysis
under the Dormant Commerce Clause: one for state laws that
facially discriminate against out-of-state interests, and another
for state laws that apply uniformly to in-state and out-of-state
interests, but incidentally burden interstate commerce. 23 3 State
laws that facially discriminate against out-of-state goods are per
se invalid. 2 34 In contrast, state laws that do not discriminate
facially, but nonetheless have some incidental effect on interstate
commerce, are deemed valid unless the burden on interstate

has the gamut of powers necessary to control the economy, including the
vital power of erecting customs barriersagainstforeign competition, has as
its corollary that the states are not separableeconomic units. [The] material

success that has come to inhabitants of the states which make up this
federal free trade unit has been the most impressive in the history of
commerce, but the established interdependence of the states
only
emphasizes the necessity of protecting interstate movement of goods
against local burdens. [The] distinction between the power of the State to
shelter its people from menaces to their health and safety... even when
the dangers emanate from interstate commerce, and its lack of power to
retard, burden or constrict the flow of such commerce to their economic
advantage is one deeply rooted in both our history and our law. [This]
Court consistently has rebuffed attempts of states to advance their own
commercial interests by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce,
either into or out of the state, while generally supporting their right to
impose even burdensome regulations in the interest of local health and
safety. [Our] system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the
certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that
no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by
customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer
may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation
to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the
Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it
[reality].
Id. (cited in GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTLrUIONAL LAW 212-13 (12th ed. 1991)
(emphasis added)).
232.
See, e.g., Oregon Waste Systems v. Oregon Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 114
S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
233. Id. The ECJ employs a similar analysis. It distinguishes between
"distinctly applicable laws" and "indistinctly applicable laws." The former have
generally been ruled invalid, until the Belgian Waste Case. Indistinctly applicable
laws have been subjected to a balancing test. See supra part III.A. (describing
applicable ECJ caselaw).
234.
See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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commerce is "clearly excessive35 in relation to the putative local
2
benefits" under the state law.
In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court faced a case arising on facts
quite similar to those of the Belgian Waste Case in City of
Philadelphiav. New Jersey.2 36 In Philadelphia,the Court reviewed
a New Jersey law that barred private disposal enterprises in New
The
Jersey from importing waste from other states.23 7
implementation of this law prohibited garbage haulers from
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, from disposing waste in privatelyowned New Jersey landfills. 23 8 The Court stated that the New
Jersey law, regardless of its ultimate purpose, could not
discriminate against "articles of commerce coming from outside
the [s]tate unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to
treat them differently." 239 Because there was no such reason, the
New Jersey law impermissibly "impose[d] on out-of-state
commercial interests the full burden of conserving landfill space"

in New Jersey. 2 40

As such, the Court characterized the New

Jersey law as an "attempt by one [s]tate to isolate itself from a
problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the
movement of interstate trade."2 4 1 The U.S. Supreme Court, when
faced with a ban on waste importation, resorted to its per se
analysis; because such laws discriminated on their face, they
were per se unconstitutional.
Since 1978, the Court has revisited the issue of the interstate
movement of waste in several cases; each time, it has sustained
2 42
the fundamental principles of Philadelphia.
In 1992, the Court
invalidated an Alabama law that imposed an additional fee on the
disposal of hazardous waste generated outside the state.2 43 Two
years later, the Court struck down similar legislation from
Oregon, even though that state provided financial analysis to

235. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
236. 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see Geradin, supra note 25. For a discussion of
the law of the United States, see David Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphia
v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial"Natural"Resources,
and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1989).
237. Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 618-19.
238. Id. at 619.
239. Id. at 627.
240. Id. at 628.
241. Id. Significantly, the Court did not comment on whether New Jersey
could prohibit out-of-state waste if it owned all of the landfills in the state. Id. at
627 n. 6. If it did, it might have invoked the market participant exception.
242. Oregon Waste Systems v. Oregon Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 114 S.Ct.
1677 (1994); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S.Ct. 2009 (1992).
243. Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992)
(invalidating an Alabama law that imposed a higher fee for disposal of out-of-state
waste than on waste generated in-state).
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justify the differential between fees charged to in-state and out-ofFinally, in 1994, the Court regarded as
state dumpers. 2 "
unconstitutional a municipal flow control ordinance, which
required all waste moving through a town to be processed at a
particular transfer station; the town imposed the requirement as
a means of financing the construction of the waste processing
center. 2 4 S In each case, the Court regarded any discriminatory
treatment of out-of-state interests as unconstitutional.
Contrasting the reasoning of Philadelphia and its progeny
with the Belgian Waste Case reveals sharp contrasts between the
jurisprudence of the United States and the European Community.
In the United States, the drafting of the Commerce Clause was
motivated by political goals as much as economic interests. 24 6 In
the European Community, economic goals have been the primary
motivation; although political aspirations have been mentioned
since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, they have remained in the
background. The history of the European Community to date has

focused primarily on the benefits of a common market for the free

movement of goods. The Maastricht Treaty, which was the first

244.

Oregon Waste Systems v. Oregon Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S.

Ct. 1345 (1994) (invalidating a purportedly cost-based, higher disposal fee for
out-of-state waste than in-state waste).
245.
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 114 S. Ct. 1677
(1994). The better reasoned view in this case, however, is the dissent. See
Carbone, supra, 114 S. Ct. at 1691.
Another significant point raised about this line of cases is that lurking behind
this discussion of constitutional principles is the reality that it may be of limited
practical importance. In the United States, nearly eighty percent of all landfills
are operated by state or municipal governments, not private enterprises. Oregon
Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 114 S. Ct. 1345,
1357 (1994) (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (citing U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Subtitle D Study: Phase I
Report, at 4-7, tbl. 4-2 (Oct. 1986)).
Under U.S. law, such government enterprises are exempted from Dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine; this status is accorded by the "market participant
exemption." 1d. (citing South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82, 93 (1984)). In South-Central Timber, the Court stated that "if a State is
acting as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator, the dormant
Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities." South-Central Timber,
467 U.S. at 93.
Because Philadelphia and its progeny may apply to only one-fifth of waste
disposal operations in the United States, some commentators may regard this
debate a waste, or much ado about nothing. Although their argument raises
significant questions, further discussion is beyond the scope of this Note.
246.
LAWRENCE TRIBE, CONSI'rr1IONAL LAW 417 (2d ed. 1988). According to
Tribe, the "negative implications of the commerce clause derive principally from a
political theory of union, not from an economic theory of free trade. The function
of the clause is to ensure national solidarity, not economic efficiency." Id.
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EC treaty to emphasize political goals, 24 7 has encountered
considerable resistance. 2 48 Ultimately, the developing European

Union differs significantly from the United States. While the
member states of the Community may strongly support measures
that reap clear economic benefits, they will be much more
reluctant to endorse measures that encroach on traditional
spheres of their sovereignty.
However, the ECJ should not encourage such resistance or
cast its rulings in a manner that allows such political sentiments
to become entrenched in Community law. The Court would better
promote the goals of the EC Treaty by simplifying its
jurisprudence along the lines of the United States Supreme
Court.2 49
In the United States, the Commerce Clause and
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine serve important roles in
defining the political union 25 ° and in shaping the national

247.
STEINER, supranote 2, at 8. The Maastricht Treaty reaffirmed the goals
set forth by the earlier treaties and added language committing the member
states to: common foreign and security policies as well as a common currency,
and ultimately full economic and monetary union. Id.
248.
For example, the attempt to establish a common currency failed.
Although this endeavor sounds like an economic issue, it has strong political
ramifications.
Its failure also revealed considerable reluctance among the
member states to certain Community objectives. See, e.g., Europe's Currency
Tangle, ECONOMIsT-U.K ED., Jan. 30, 1993 at 21.
249.
Interestingly, the EC's contortion of its version of the Commerce
Clause has parallels in U.S. history. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 56, at 123-24.
Though U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt pushed for legislation that

would affect areas "traditionally reserved for state regulation" (such as labor law),
the Court continued to emphasize a distinction between commerce and
manufacturing or production. Id. The Court held that Congress could not
legislate on matters of production, which was an area reserved to the states. Id.
This distinction remained in place until 1937, when the Supreme Court ruled that
"Congress could regulate activities that directly or indirectly affected interstate
commerce." Id. at 128.
Since the 1930s, the Court has interpreted congressional powers under the
Commerce Clause as plenary. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
250.
See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994). The Court
stated:
The "negative aspect of the Commerce Clause was considered the more
important by the "father of the Constitution," James Madison. In one of
his letters, Madison wrote that the Commerce Clause "grew out of the
abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the non-importing,
and was intended as a negative and preventative provision against
injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a power to be used
for the positive purposes of the [federal] Government.
Id. at 2211 n. 9 (citing 3 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 478 (1911)).
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In contrast, the developing body of ECJ caselaw

appears less likely to foster a common market than to allow the
balkanization of member states.
Since the passage of the Single European Act in 1987, the
ECJ has become more tolerant of environmental laws that impede
the movement of waste across the Community. Viewed one way,
the Court has just deferred to the legislature, which has carved
out an exception to the general principle of ensuring the free
movement of goods for the issue of waste. 25 2 The European
Commission has passed laws relying on the proximity principle
and the Court has appropriately deferred to the legislature's
judgment. This interpretation, however, does not account for the
ruling in the Belgian Waste Case, which vindicated an individual
state's ban on waste importation.
In that case, the Court
elevated the political branches' emphasis on the proximity
principle to a higher constitutional level, such that it eclipses
other Treaty principles (specifically the free movement of goods
and the polluter pays principle). 25 3
The latter has become
virtually lost amid the discussion of waste in the European
Community. Though the polluter pays principle also appears in
the EC Treaty, and is supposed to guide Community
environmental policymaking, it presently has no practical
significance.

251. For an interesting perspective on the role of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, see ELY, supranote 56, at 139 (1992). According to Professor Ely,
...the primary purpose of dormant commerce jurisprudence is to foster
free trade within a national marketplace. Judicial opinions speak in terms
of safeguarding interstate trade, but in actuality dormant commerce power
protects the entrepreneurial liberty of individuals and corporations to
conduct business across state lines. In the modem era, judicial review of
state economic regulations under the commerce clause serves some of the
same functions as economic due process before the constitutional
revolution of 1937. By balancing economic interests against a state's
rationale for regulation, the Supreme Court effectively inquires into the
reasonableness of economic legislation.
Thus, dormant commerce
jurisdiction preserves an important role for the federal courts in the field
of economic rights.
Id.
252

See, e.g., Bob Hagerty, Legal Beat: EC Court Backs Limits on Imports of

Rubbish, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 14, 1992.
253. Some commentators regard the current state of affairs as acceptable,
reflecting a sound balance of trade and environmental protection. See, e.g., Jans,
supranote 24; Geradin, supranote 25.
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B. How a Proposalto Revive the PolluterPays Principle Can
Address the Legislative and JudicialThreats of Environmental

Protectionism
Despite the Community's overwhelming emphasis on the
proximity principle, legislation initially proposed by the European

Commission in 1989 offers an opportunity to breathe life into the
polluter pays principle. This legislation, the Proposal for a
Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damages Caused by Waste

(Proposed Directive), also provides a means by which the
Community can stop the trend toward environmental
protectionism.

At present, absent liability for environmental

damage, the externalities of waste disposal are not paid by the
polluter, but rather by the member states and their taxpayers.
Absent liability, polluters can dump wastes without paying for the
damage that they cause. This problem is exacerbated by the

"Wallonia problem" 2 54-in a European common market in which
member states have varying environmental standards, harmful
concentrations of waste sites will develop in states with the lowest
environmental standards. In short, waste flows downstream to
If
states with the least demanding environmental standards.
liability were imposed uniformly across the Community, polluters
would have to factor the costs of potential liability into their own
expenses, regardless of where they disposed of their waste; this
cost internalization would correct the current market failure in
which polluters do not bear the entire cost of their operations.
By establishing a tool to foster cost internalization, the
Proposed Directive would reduce irresponsible dumping, a
primary concern that has led to the current trend of
environmental protectionism in the European Community. Thus,

the Proposed Directive would enable the Community to function

as a common market. Without trade barriers, the market would
be able to function efficiently. Although no state wants to allow
its scenic countryside to become the site of landfills, ultimately
most states will allow them. However, all of the states, or regions
within the states, will not be equally well suited for waste
disposal. The best way to decide how to site landfills is to
establish uniform standards and then allow the market to find the
best solution; this strategy will work well so long as there are
uniform standards for waste disposal across the Community.

254. See discussion supra part I (discussing the problem of an inordinate
number of landfills developing in Wallonia because of that region's lower
environmental standards within a common market that included areas with
higher environmental standards).
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The Proposed Directive 255 would establish a uniform law that
imposes liability across the Community. As such, it would clearly
implement the polluter pays principle. 25 6 Moreover, the Proposed

Directive would accomplish this goal in a manner consistent with
the other principles of European waste policy. Again, because it
would impose liability for environmental damage throughout the
Community, it would reduce the present demand for severe
import restrictions, which arose from the "Wallonia problem."
Thus, the Proposed Directive would promote the free movement of
waste in the Community.
1. The Proposed Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused
by Waste
In 1989 the European Commission completed drafting the
Proposed Directive; following initial comments, the Commission
amended its proposal in 1991.257 The Proposed Directive sets
forth a legislative scheme that includes a liability law, which
assesses liability among those parties responsible for the
discharge of waste, and a compensation fund, which would help
pay for a cleanup when a liable party cannot be found or cannot
pay the full costs of a cleanup. As such, the Proposed Liability
Directive generally parallels United States legislation regarding
liability for the release of waste, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
25 8
commonly known as Superfund or CERCLA.
a. The Basis for Legislation

Several environmental catastrophes and scandals in Europe
precipitated political action to develop a tough policy that would

255. Amended Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil
Liability for Damage Caused by Waste, 1991 O.J. (C 192) 6 [hereinafter Proposed

Directive]. The Commission initially proposed a directive in 1989, Commission
Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability Caused by Waste, 1989 O.J. (C
251) 4. The difference between the two are beyond the scope of this Note. For
clarity, all discussion of the "Proposed Directive" regards the 1991 Amended
Proposal.
256.
principles
pay").
257.
258.

Proposed Directive, supra note 255, pmbl. para. 14 ("Whereas the
established in Article 130r(2) of the Treaty that the polluter should
Luiki & Stephenson, supra note 3, at 405 n. 15.
4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 475 (1992) (explaining

that Superfund had four basic elements, the other two being information
gathering and authorization for federal response to emergencies and cleanup).
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25 9
make polluters pay for any environmental damage they cause.
The European Commission drafted the Proposed Directive
260

primarily as a measure necessary for trade harmonization.
According to the Commission, the legislation is necessary at the

Community level to prevent market distortions that result from
26 1
the member states having varied environmental standards.
Moreover, the preamble of the Proposed Directive suggests that

including the cost of environmental damage in the price of waste
is necessary for prevention of future environmental damage, one
of the

other

key

principles

guiding

the

Community's

waste

Polluters, faced with substantial costs if liable for
policy.2 62
environmental damage, will seek the most economically efficient
way to avoid such costs; one means of reducing exposure

to

liability is to reduce the amount of waste produced. Thus, the EC
views the Proposed Directive as a significant component of its
Waste

Strategy,

which

will

complement

existing

laws.

The

Directive revives the polluter pays principle as a means of shifting
cleanup costs back to the polluter and as a

way to improve

prevention.
b. The Nature and Scope of Liability
The Proposed Directive adopts strict liability as the standard
263
best suited to remedying the waste problem.

This choice is

based partially on the "inherent risk" involved in waste handling

and disposal. 2 64 Adopting a strict liability standard would reduce

the cost of enforcement by removing the need for enforcement

agencies

to

prove

negligence.

It would also

force

cost

internalization by the companies, making them bear the burden
Finally, it will have preventive, or
rather that the taxpayers.

deterrent, effects. A company that knows it must pay the costs of

See discussion supranote 30 (regarding environmental disasters).
259.
260. Proposed Directive, supranote 255, pmbl. para. 1. The proposal opens
with the words: "Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community, and in particular Article 100a thereof." Id.
Current Report: European-Level Liability Gets Mixed Response from
261.
Environment Ministers, 16 Int'l Envtl. Rep. 928 (Dec. 15, 1993). Though European
ministers agreed that an EC law was necessary, they also emphasized that such
legislation "should be regarded circumspectly otherwise." Id.
Proposed Directive, supranote 255, pmbl. para. 14.
262.
Id. art. 3 ("The producer of waste shall be liable under civil law for the
263.
damage and impairment of the environment caused by the waste, irrespective of
fault on his part"). Id.
264. Id. pmbl. para. 14 (setting forth the premises of this choice: "in view of
the risk inherent in the very existence of waste, the strict liability of the producer
constitutes the best solution").
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its dumping will seek to reduce its production of such waste
requiring disposal.
Under the Proposed Directive, strict liability would also be
joint and several. 2 65 Thus, a plaintiff may recover the entire cost
of cleanup from any one of the liable parties. The Proposed
Directive attempts to "channel" liability; that is, it focuses liability
on particular groups of polluters. 2 6 6 This broad exposure to
liability, however, is tempered by "concepts of fairness and
reasonableness" that have been incorporated into the Proposed
Directive. 2 6 7 Most significantly, the Proposed Directive would
not apply retroactively. 268 This non-retroactivity provision may
serve as the greatest limitation on liability in the entire scheme of
the Proposed Directive. There are several reasons why the EC
drafters did not impose retroactive liability. First, there has been
a consensus in the Community that retroactive liability has been
the one of the most controversial aspects of the U.S. Superfund
law. As one commentator noted: "By avoiding retroactivity, the
EC will avoid the inefficiency, uncertainty, unfairness, and
costliness which plagues the Superfund program." 26 9 Second,
retroactivity is contrary to the general principle of legal certainty
that pervades Community law. 2 70 Third, retroactivity would be
265.

Id. art. 5 ("Where, under this Directive, two or more persons are liable

for the same damage or the same impairment of the environment, they shall be
liable jointly and severally"). Id. While this scheme itself has been somewhat
controversial in the United States, most of the criticism has arisen because of its
interplay with the other provisions of CERCLA.
266. Id. At least one industry representative supports this scheme, but
emphasized the importance of a "strong causal link" between the damage and the

actions of a particular factory. Id.
267.
Luild & Stephenson, supranote 3, at 406 (stating that the fairness and
reasonableness of the Directive should ameliorate some of the concerns raised by
the harshness of the United States Superfund law).
268. Proposed Directive, supra note 255, art. 13 ("This Directive shall not
apply to damage or impairment of the environment arising from an incident which
occurred before the date on which its provisions are implemented"). Id.
269. Luiki & Stephenson, supra note 3, at 406. Though much maligned,
the retroactive nature of CERCLA has withstood constitutional challenge in the
United States. Jones & McSlarrow, ... But Were Afraid To Ask" Superfund Case
Law, 1981-1989, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,430, at 10,431 nn. 10-16 (1989).
270. The "principle of non-retroactivity" is part of the concept of "legal
certainty," a general principle of law that has been incorporated in Community
law. STEINER, supranote 2, at 60 (citing Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 2)).
This principle, "applied to Community secondary legislation, precludes a measure
from taking effect before its publication." Id. The other half of"legal certainty" is
"the principle of legitimate expectations." This means "in the absence of an
overriding matter of public interest, Community measures must not violate the
legitimate expectations of the parties concerned." Id. A legitimate expectation is
one that a reasonable person would hold under the circumstances. Id.
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out of character with the "cooperative relationship" between
European industries and governments. 2 7 1 Fourth, by making the
liability scheme only apply prospectively, the Proposed Directive
2 72
should not wreak havoc on the European insurance industry.
Thus, by establishing a scheme of strict liability, but not imposing
it retroactively, the Proposed Directive adapts the model of the
U.S. Superfund law for European soil.
The next question is who is liable? The primary party held
2 73 of waste. 2 74
liable under the Directive is the "producer"
Producer is defined as "any person who, in the course of a

commercial or industrial activity, produces waste . . ."275 The
Directive relieves a "producer" of waste in three situations: (1)
upon delivery to an eliminator; 2 76 (2) when someone else has

actual control of the waste at the time of an incident causing

damage2 77 and; (3) when waste has been imported from outside
the Community. 2 78 An eliminator is a person whose business is
An eliminator may avoid liability if the
waste disposal. 2 79
28 0
producer defrauded him regarding the nature of any delivery.
A controller is one who had "actual control of the waste when the
incident giving rise to the damage . .. occurred."2 8 ' Controllers

Application of strict liability would violate these general principles of Community
law.
Luiki & Stephenson, supra note 3, at 406.
271.
272. Freeman & McSlarrow, supranote 24, at 187.
273. Proposed Directive, supranote 255, art. 2(a).
274. Id. art. 2(1)(b). This provision uses the definition of waste from Council
Directive 75/442, O.J. (L 194) 39 (1975).
275. Proposed Directive, supra note 255, art. 2(a).
Id. art. 2(2)(c) (holding liable "the person responsible for the
276.
installation, establishment or undertaing where the waste was lawfully
transferred.. ."); Michael McCann, CERCLA and the European Community's Civil
Liability Proposal:A Comparison of U.S. and E.C. Law Pertainingto Liability from
Environmental Harm Caused by Hazardous Wastes, 11 BAIT. J. ENVrL. L. 161
(1991). This differs significantly from CERCLA, which holds both parties liable.
Proposed Directive, supra note 255, art. 2(2)(b) (holding liable "the
277.
person who had actual control of the waste when the incident giving rise to the
damage to or impairment of the environment occurred"). Liability under this
provision has been referred to as "controller" liability. Mounteer, supranote 26, at
127 (citing Turner T. Smith & Roszell D. Hunter, The Revised European Civil
Liability for Damage from Waste Proposal, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,718, at 10,721

(Dec. 1991)).
278. Proposed Directive, supra note 255, art. 2(2)(a) (holding liable "the
person who imports the waste into the Community").
279. A producer, however, is not relieved of liability if he holds a permit, id.
art. 6(2); nor if he purported to limit or avoid such liability by contract. Id. art. 8.
280. Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 2.
281.
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the producer within

a

c. Options When the Polluter Cannot Pay
The
Proposed
Directive
suggests
several
alternative
approaches for when the polluter cannot pay, either because it no
28 3
longer exists, cannot be determined, or has become insolvent.
First, it attempts to avoid such a situation by requiring producers
of waste to maintain adequate insurance to cover the risk of
environmental damage. 28 4
Second, the Proposed Directive
provides that the European Council shall determine common
rules for when the liable person cannot fully pay for the damage
he has caused; 28 5 it also provides for compensation when the
liable person "cannot be identified." 28 6
Finally, the Proposed
Directive directs the Commission to "study the feasibility" of
establishing
a
"European
fund"
to
cover
otherwise
2 87
uncompensated damages.
While the details of this European Fund remain sketchy, it
appears that the European Community contemplates establishing
a public fund to pay for environmental damage when a polluter
cannot be properly identified. The creation of such a fund to
assist with payments for the cleanups it mandated was the "most
ingenious political stroke" behind the U.S. Superfund law.28 8
This fund is financed in part by a tax on businesses that
benefited from inexpensive disposal and that have posed
substantial risks to society. 28 9 This fund is used in two ways:
parties that have undertaken approved cleanups can make claims
against the fund, and the United States government can increase
the fund through civil actions against all potentially responsible

282. Id. art. 2(2)(b).
283. Id. art. 11.
284. Id. art. 11(1). Given the bar on retroactive application, insuring these
enterprises may be easier. See Goldberg, supra note 26 (discussing insurance
issues).
285. Id. art. 11(2)(i) (Council shall determine common rules governing the
situation arising "where the person liable is incapable of providing full
compensation for the damage and/or impairment of the environment caused").
286. Id. art. 11(2)(ii).
287. Id. art. 11 flush left after 2. This executes the goal expressed in the
preamble. Id. pmbl. para. 25 ("Whereas rules must be laid down at Community
level for compensation for damage and impairment of the environment caused by
waste in the event that payment of full compensation is not possible"). Id.
288.

WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 478 (1992).

289.

Id. at 479.
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parties. 290
In this regard, the U.S. Superfund "revolves" to
finance and implement cleanups; it is not a subsidy for cleanups.
Whether the final version of the Proposed Directive will fully
employ such a fund remains to be seen.

2. Fear of a Foreign Law: How the Perception of the United States
Superfund Law Has Nearly Buried the Proposed Directive
Through May 1995, the European Community has taken no
further official action on the Proposed Directive. 2 91 European
industries have been divided on the proposal. Some worry that
the Directive still too closely resembles the notorious United
States Superfund law.2 92 Significantly, Europeans have become
aware of the criticisms of Superfund. For example, in 1992, the
European edition of the Wall Street Journal reported the
conclusions of a study of the U.S. Superfund law. The study
stated that almost ninety percent of money spent on Superfund

290.
291.

Id.
Interestingly, several member states of the European Community have

shown their support for liability legislation in another forum, the Council of
Europe. The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental organization with a
membership of twenty-six European States. GEORGE A. BERMAN & ROGER J.
GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 34 (1993). Members
include the states in the European Community as well as the former
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Headed by a Committee of Ministers and
national parliamentary representatives in a Consultative Assembly, it has
produced numerous conventions. Id.
In 1993, the Council of Europe adopted a binding Convention that established
Council of Europe:
civil liability for damage caused by hazardous waste.
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to
the Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228 [hereinafter Council of Europe
Convention].
The seven signatories to this Convention on Civil Liability are
Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Finland, Liechtenstein, and the Netherlands.
Significantly, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany and Denmark will not sign
the Council of Europe Convention. Germany is reluctant because of the burdens
of unification. The United Kingdom and Denmark are reluctant because of
discrepancies between the convention and existing national legislation. Id.
Further, other commentators have questioned the value of the signature of the
former Czech Republic and Slovakia, because of the severe environmental
problems those countries face owing to their heavy industries. Id. Therefore, the
effect of this Convention remains uncertain. However, it does raise significant
questions about the relations of the Council of Europe to the European
Community.
292.
See, e.g., 16 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 839 (Nov. 17, 1993) (quoting
representatives from the European Chemical Industry Council and E.I duPont
Corporation).
John Lynn of E.I.duPont Corporation expressed concern that,
despite regular statements that the Community did not want to "make the same
mistakes as the United States," and that the legislation "had worrying similarities
with [S]uperfund." Id.
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went to lawyers. 2 93
These reports undoubtedly inform the
European debate and may be one reason why the Proposed
Directive has not yet become law. Others believe that adopting a
2 94
uniform law is more important than its actual content.
Ultimately, imposing civil liability for environmental damage
caused by waste offers the best means of achieving the Maastricht
Treaty's goal of "sustainable development."
The Proposed
Directive would force cost internalization and preserve the free
movement of goods through the Community.
Though some
commentators believe that existing Community law has
established a suitable framework for regulating waste, 2 9 5 the
development of a Waste Strategy shaped almost entirely by the
proximity principle threatens a regime of environmental
protectionism. 2 9 6 Although the Proposed Directive offers a way to
avoid environmental protectionism, the fear of creating a
"Eurofund" replete with the problems of the United States
Superfund legislation has delayed, and might defeat, the Proposed
Liability Directive. 2 97
The alternative to the Proposed
Directive-the continued development of law and policy under the
Belgian Waste Case-will undermine the ideals of the European
Community, bury the polluter pays principle, and result in
deleterious economic and environmental effects.
3. Sustaining the Dialogue
In May 1993, the European Commission disseminated a
communication regarding the Proposed Directive to the European
Council and Parliament.
Subtitled the "Green Paper on

293. Law Brief. Superfund Cases, WALL ST. J.-EUR, Apr. 28, 1992, at 4,
available in LEXIS, WSJ-EUR file. The author of the report claimed that of the
$1.3 billion spend on Superfund-related claims made to insurance companies
between 1986 and 1989, almost $1 billion was paid to attorneys. Id.
294.
Id. Jean-Marie Devos, representing the European Chemical Industrial
Council, stressed the importance of having an EC law that is "concrete and
transcribed to regions in a homogeneous way." Id.
295.
See Jans, supra note 24.
Professor Jans of the Centre for
Environmental Law of the University of Amsterdam concludes that the "EEC has
developed, with the aid of [the ECJ], a suitable framework for waste disposal
policy." Id. at 176.
296.
See suprapart II (discussing EC legislation regarding waste).
297.
There has been considerable criticism of CERCLA, emphasizing that as

a solution the Superfund law takes a greater toll on the quality of life than the
risks it was supposed to address.

See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE

VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTNE RISK REGULATION (1993); PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE

DEATH OF COMMON SENSE (1994).
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Remedying Environmental Damage" (Green Paper),2 98 this report
discusses the Proposed Directive in straightforward terms. The
Green Paper acknowledges that the polluter pays principle is an
important part of European law.2 9 9 It also ties this principle to
prevention and points out the danger of trade distortion that
3°
arises from the lack of a uniform law across the community. 0

In general, it provides a useful summary of the proposed liability
legislation. In particular, the Green Paper suggests when the
Proposed Directive would impose liability and when it would allow
recourse to a new, public, Community-level compensation fund.

The following table indicates the Community's thinking on the
relevant factors for choosing the appropriate option.

THE SHAPE OFTHE PROPOSED DIRECTIVE:
THE GREEN PAPER'S ANALYSIS OF WHEN LIABILITY IS APPROPRIATE
LIAILIT APPROPRIATE

30 1

L1ABILITY INAPPROPRIATE:
USE COMPENSATION FUND

Measurable and immediate

Unbounded or latent damage

damage
Finite act or incident

Cumulative acts or incidents

Identifiable liable parties

Unidentifiable liable parties

Liability (fault-based or strict)

No basis for liability

Causal link established

No causal link determinable

Party with legal interest
who can bring action

No party with legal interest to
bring action

298.
Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament
and the Economic and Social Committee:
Green Paper on Remedying
Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47 final [hereinafter Green Paper].
299. Id. at 18 (stating that imposing "liability for the cost of cleaning up
environmental contamination would be a concrete application of [the polluter
pays] principle").
300. The Green Paper states:
A Community-wide system of civil liability for environmental damage
would draw on a basic and universal principle of civil law, the concept that
a person should rectify damage that he causes. This legal principle is
strongly related to two principles forming the basis of Community
environmental policy since the adoption of the Single [European] Act, the
principle of prevention and the "polluter pays" principle.
Id. at 5.
301.
Id. at 24. The chart incoporated in the text is simply reformatted from
the text of the Green Paper.
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This summary suggests that the Community will impose liability
when the polluter and extent of damage are readily identifiable.
Alternatively, when a polluter cannot be so easily identified and
imposing liability on a particular party may result in an injustice,
the Community will pay to remediate the damage from a newly
created public compensation fund.
While the Green Paper has brought additional attention to
the idea of liability legislation, it has also drawn more criticism
toward it. For example, in response to the release of the Green
Paper, the UK Environment Minister stated that his country
intended to "keep national control over the legal framework for
30 2
civil liability and rejected EC-wide comprehensive legislation.
Such resistance is likely to continue and debate over the ideal
shape of an EC liability law could continue to the end of this
century. However, if the Proposed Directive languishes and the
current waste policy remains in effect, the Community will suffer.
The preceding parts discussed major problems with the EC's
current waste policy. Part I revealed that the current liability
schemes of the member states vary considerably; this situation
has resulted in environmental tragedies like that which occurred
in Wallonia. Part II examined the development of an EC waste
strategy and noted that current policy has been shaped
predominantly by the proximity principle, the idea that waste
should be disposed of close to its source. Part III looked at the
European Court of Justice, the final arbiter of Community law.
Regarding waste policy, the Court has upheld various laws
restraining the free movement of waste through the Community;
the Court has upheld Community legislation as well as import
bans on waste adopted by individual member states. As such, the
Court has elevated the proximity principle above the Community's
fundamental goal of securing the free movement of goods. Part IV
first emphasized that the Court should abandon its trend of
inviting environmental protectionism, and should instead

consider the United States interstate commerce jurisprudence as
a better means of protecting a common market. Part IV also
examined a recent proposal to establish a Community-wide
liability scheme for environmental harm caused by waste and
suggested that it offers a better solution for the Community than
its current policy. By implementing the polluter pays principle
through the Proposed Directive, the Community would improve a
waste policy that has relied to heavily on the proximity principle.

302.
Environment Minister Criticizes EC Paper on Civil Liability for
EnvironmentalDamage, 16 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 774 (Oct. 20, 1993).
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More importantly, by making polluters pay-no matter where they
dispose of their waste within the Community-the Proposed
Directive would reduce the likelihood of encountering the
"Wallonia problem." The next section discusses the most recent,
significant Community action regarding the Proposed Directive.

V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This Note concludes with a series of recommendations for
As presently written, the
improving the Proposed Directive.
Proposed Directive offers an opportunity to improve the
Community's regulation of waste by implementing the polluter
pays principle. In simplest terms, the Directive makes polluters
pay by imposing liability on those persons who dispose of waste in
a manner that causes environmental damage. In its present
form, the Proposed Directive would significantly improve the
Community's waste policy.
Nonetheless, the Proposed Directive could benefit from
several changes. First, given the difficulties of implementing and
enforcing directives, liability legislation should take the form of a
regulation. Second, the Proposed Directive should incorporate
several provisions that will encourage a fair apportionment of
environmentalists,
and
Scholars, practitioners,
liability.
corporate leaders will all find fault with the law ultimately
adopted. Nonetheless, the Community should adopt the Proposed
Directive in order to revive the polluter pays principle and to halt
30 3
the creeping trend of environmental protectionism.
A. Why a Regulation Would PromoteBetter Enforcement of Any
Scheme Imposing Civil Liabilityfor EnvironmentalDamage
There are several problems with enacting this liability
First, directives have encountered
legislation as a directive.
several general problems, including slow incorporation into the
national laws of member states and weak enforcement. Second,
member states may implement the directive's requirements
differently. For these reasons, the liability legislation would be
more effective if adopted as a regulation.

303.
See, e.g., James A. Rogers & P. Kathleen Wells, Superfund Reform Act
of 1994, 948 ALI-ABA 773 (1994).

604

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 28:543

1. General Problems with Directives
The first reason why a regulation is a better form for the
proposed liability legislation is that the enforcement of EC
directives has been notoriously weak.0 4 The absence of a central
oversight and enforcement agency has left implementation and
enforcement of directives to the discretion of each state.

Moreover, some member states, including France and Germany,

lack statewide oversight and implementation agencies.3 0 5 While
the European Commission has responsibility for ensuring 3the
06
implementation of directives, that task is enormously complex.
2. Varying Concepts of Liability Among the Member States
Under a directive, the member states determine the best
means of achieving the goals laid out by the Community. The
general problems with directives are compounded by the
complexity of liability issues. Presently, the standards of liability
for environmental damage vary considerably across the member
states.30 7
However, certain general propositions about the

304.
Smith, supra note 24, at 393; Macrory, supranote 67.
305.
Smith, supra note 24. See generally id. at 357-391 (summarizing the
hazardous waste regulations of the former Federal Republic of Germany, France,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark and Italy).
306. A recent development may improve the Community's ability to enforce
directives. The Maastricht Treaty empowers the European Commission to file a
case for a "lump sum or penalty payment" if a member state fails to take
measures necessary to comply with a judgment of the European Court of Justice.
TREMYON EUROPEAN UNION, art. 171(2). This provision provides:
If the member state concerned fails to take the necessary measures to
comply with the Court's judgment within the time limit laid down by the
Commission, the latter may bring the case before the Court of Justice. In
so doing it shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment
to be paid by the member state concerned which it considers appropriate
in the circumstances. If the Court of Justice finds that the member state
concerned has not complied with its judgment, it may impose a lump sum

or penalty payment on it. This procedure shall be without prejudice to
Article 170.
Id. While this provision may assist the Commission, enforcement is likely to
remain a difficult problem. Under another principle of EC law, the ECJ has ruled
that individuals can obtain damages against their national government for the
non-implementation of a directive, if the directive grants rights to individuals; the
rights are "identifiable on the basis of the provisions of the directive" and a link
exists between the "violation of the obligation incumbent upon the state and the
damage suffered by the injured persons." STEINER, supranote 2, at 37-38.
307.
See Williams, supra note 24, at 223-230; Luiki & Stephenson, supra
note 3, at 407-4 10; Klingamen, supranote 26, at 147-154.
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existing state laws can be stated.3 0 8 First, recovery of damages is
generally difficult.3 0 9 Second, European waste producers are not
"generally held liable for injury caused by waste after it has
Third,
passed into the possession of another person."3 10
producers have not been subject to substantial costs relating to
311
financial assurance for proper waste related activities.
Beyond these basic propositions, however, the laws of the
member states vary significantly.3 1 2 For example, under German
law, the government has discretion to determine which party will
3 13
be held liable among multiple potentially responsible parties.
The government considers an array of factors, including a party's
financial position, their responsibility for the pollution, and their
ability to abate it. 3 14 The high costs of cleanup and the absence
of a right to contribution from the other parties pose not only a
substantial deterrent under German law, but also fundamental
3 1s
questions of fairness.
In contrast, the United Kingdom holds a different view of
In the Cambridge Water Case, the Law Lords-the
liability.
highest court in England-rummaged through English common
law examining forms of liability that have been imposed in the
past. 1 6 The Court decided that none of these common law
theories provided a basis for holding a party liable for "historic
pollution,"3 17 damage that is not entirely caused by the current
owner, but rather has accumulated over time on a particular
property. This approach differs significantly from that which a
German court might employ.
Cambridge Water is like a divining rod for the problems that
the Proposed Directive would encounter if adopted. It suggests
that member states are likely to view their own national laws as
adequate to address their environmental problems. For example,
in November 1993, the UK Minister for the Environment
proclaimed his state's "clear view that EC action is neither needed

308.
See generally Williams, supranote 24, at 223-230.
309.
Williams, supranote 24, at 223.
310.
Id.
311.
Id.
312.
Id.
313.
Gunter Hager, Waste Control Under German Law: Liability and
Preventive Measures,25 HOUS. L. REV. 963, 973 (1988) (citations omitted).
314.
Id.
315.
Id.
316. Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc, [1994] 1 All
ER 53 (H.L., December 9, 1993).

317.

Id.
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or wanted" with regard to liability for waste.3 1 8 Given the ruling
in Cambridge Water and the statement of the UK Minister, it
seems likely that the United Kingdom would simply retain its own
laws and insist that they are adequate to comply with the EC
Liability Directive.
Because of the aforementioned problems, the Community's
liability legislation should take the form of a regulation. A
regulation, by definition, would impose a uniform standard
across the Community in one fell swoop.31 9 By adopting a
regulation, the EC would begin to harmonize the liability laws of
countries with traditions as different as England and Germany.
Through the Maastricht Treaty, the member states reaffirmed
their commitment to achieve an "ever closer union." Since 1987,
the ascendance of the "proximity" principle, which reached its
highest point to date in the Transfrontier Shipment Regulation
and the Belgian Waste Case, has become a genuine threat to the

free movement of goods. Moreover, because the nearest disposal
site may not maintain high environmental standards, the
proximity principle may subsidize inferior processes, technologies,
and operations-ultimately it may undermine the EC's
environmental protection efforts.3 2 0 By adopting a Regulation on
Civil Liability, the Community would establish a uniform law
across its member states and might halt the development of
environmental protectionism. The adoption of such a law would
also reduce the incidence of the "Wallonia problem." There is a
need for a Community-wide system of liability that implements
the polluter pays principle. That result can be achieved most
effectively through the promulgation of a Regulation.
B. Seeking a "FairShare"Apportionment of Liability
While the Proposed Directive represents a better law than the
U.S. Superfund, several modifications would strengthen the
proposed EC law and might further reduce resistance to it. First,
the definition of "controller" should be clarified, particularly by

318.
16 Intl Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 839 (Nov. 17, 1993). U.K. Minister for the
Environment Timothy Yeo stated: "It is our clear view that EC action is neither
needed or wanted in this area. EC action can only be justified if, one, member
states' actions are not sufficient, or two, if different national approaches to civil

liability cause distortions to the single market. But the U.K. has civil liability
legislation, and I am not aware of distortions." Id.
319. See supranote 51 (discussing regulations).
320.
Cf. Jans, supra note 24, at 172 (suggesting the closest facility may not
be the best).
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excluding certain parties. Second, the Proposed Directive should
establish a procedure for allocating liability.
However, regardless of its form and despite the best efforts of
its drafters, the Proposed Directive will face significant problems
in its implementation. These include: trying to apportion liability
fairly when the harm at a particular site is indivisible, defining
"actual control" in a manner that does not cast too broad a net of
liability, and developing a policy that encourages equitable
settlements.
While these problems cannot be ignored, the
Proposed Directive adequately limits the scope of harm that these
problems might pose.
1. The Difficulty of Apportioning an Indivisible Harm
Although the Proposed Directive strives to apportion liability
fairly, this goal may become elusive when faced with a site that
presents an indivisible harm, a mixture of chemicals that have
caused harm which cannot be readily allocated based on the
relative contribution of particular polluters.3 2 1 The Proposed
Directive attempts to impose a "fair share" of liability3 22 and to
ensure that "the polluter will ultimately bear the costs imposed by
" 3 23
his own wastes, but not those caused by the waste of others.
However, the mix of substances at a particular site may not be
easily traced to their sources.
In such cases, apportioning
liability may be difficult. Even when deliveries of waste may be
traced to a particular corporation, the harm to the site may be
indivisible because of the "synergistic effects of the commingling
of different wastes."3 2 4 Because of the difficulty of allocating

321.

The Restatement sets forth the general rule for divisibility of harm.

If there is a single harm that is theoretically or practically indivisible,
each defendant is jointly or severally liable for the entire injury. However,
if there are distinct harms that are capable of division, then liability
should be apportioned according to the contribution of each defendant.
RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRs § 433 (1965).

322.
Significantly, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
attempted such a "fair share" apportionment policy at the outset of CERCLA
regulation. See Superfund Improvement Act of 1985: Hearings of S. 51 before the
Senate JudiciaryCommittee, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (hereinafter 1985 Senate
Hearings) (remarks of former EPA Administrator Thomas who acknowledged that
EPA tried an apportionment process in the program for the first two years. "We
tried a fair share approach, we tried a voluntary approach, and it did not work."
I& Perhaps the EPA should have extended its experiment for more than two
years before abandoning hope at the expense of U.S. businesses and basic
notions of justice.
323.
Freeman & McSlarrow, supranote 24.
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liability in such cases, U.S. courts have placed the burden of
apportionment upon the defendants. 325 The resulting litigation to
establish liability has trapped many potentially responsible
parties in the net of CERCLA liability, despite an array of
arguments regarding their contribution to the harm. 3 26 In the
United States, concern regarding the fairness of a cost allocation
has been relegated to second-tier contribution suits, when
potentially responsible parties seek compensation from each
3 27

other.
No legislation can resolve the problem of an indivisible harm.
The issue of apportionment, however, can be more fairly left to a
court to determine ad hoc on an equitable basis. The Proposed
Directive, however, reduces the "threat of disproportionate
liability" by limiting its scope, especially by not imposing liability
3 28
retroactively.
2. Promoting a Fair Allocation of Liability and Avoiding High
Stakes Settlement Games
The Proposed Directive expressly incorporates concepts of
fairness and reasonableness.3 2 9 Most importantly, it focuses
liability solely on the person who has possession of the waste

when the harm occurs. The Directive's emphasis on "producer"

liability should relieve some of the problems that CERCLA faced.
324. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F.Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D.
Cal. 1987); ONeil v. Picillo, 682 F.Supp. 706, 725, (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd 883 F.2d
176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
325. According to Rodgers, supra note 288, this practice began with United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that the
defendant corporation had not "carried their burden of demonstrating the
divisibility of harm and the degrees to which each defendant is responsible." Id. at
811.
326.
See RODGERS, supranote 288, at 663.
Over the years, this burden has remained as something that is
ostensibly achievable but practically out of reach.
Thus, defendants
continue to be stuck in the net of joint and several liability despite
arguments that their volumes were small, their drums were few, their
substances benign, or that their materials were not linked to the cleanup
costs, were not implicated in the release, or had been removed altogether
from the site before the trouble began.
Id. at 663-64 [citations omitted].
327.
Id. at 664. While such arguments have not been allowed in the
government's cost recovery suit, they have been permitted in contribution suits
between PRPs.
328.
Freeman & McSlarrow, supra note 24, at 180.
329.
Luild & Stephenson, supranote 3, at 406.
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The Proposed Directive generally makes the "producer" liable.
However, it relieves the producer of the liability if another party is

in "actual control" of the waste at the time it causes damage.
Thus, unlike CERCLA, which imposed liability on nearly anyone
who had any relation to the site, the Proposed Directive focuses
its liability more narrowly. This narrower definition of liability is
likely to result in a fairer apportionment of liability than under
CERCLA. As such, the Community would apportion liability
among a much narrower group0 of potentially responsible parties
33
than the U.S. Superfund law.
However, the Proposed Directive's imposition of liability for
"persons in actual control," invites litigation as much as did
CERCLA's liability for "owners." A creditor trying to protect
property that is subject to a lien might be regarded as exercising
"actual control." Under the Directive, such a creditor might be
subject to "producer liability." This problem may be compounded
as the definition of "producer liability" is fleshed out individually
by the courts and legislatures of the member states.3 3 1 Therefore,
the Proposed Directive should incorporate a procedure for
Moreover, the
allocating costs among responsible parties. 33 2
definition of "actual control" should be defined more clearly,
providing examples of what constitutes such control and
excluding activities that are insufficient to constitute "actual
control."
The Proposed Directive should incorporate a procedure for
Proposed
allocating costs among responsible parties.
amendments to the U.S. Superfund law suggest such a
process.3 3 3 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
within sixty days of beginning*an investigation to cleanup a site,
would be required to search for all potentially responsible parties
(PRPs) for that site.334 Within eighteen months thereafter, the
EPA would have to issue a list of all PRPs for that site and share
with each member of that group all information that the EPA had
33 5
obtained from information requests made to the other PRPs.
This process would give the PRPs a more complete picture of their
responsibility for a given site. Moreover, the proposed Superfund
amendments set forth a procedure for allocation among the

330.
331.
332.

Freeman & McSlarrow, supra note 24, at 178.
McCann, supranote 276, at 162.
See Rogers & Wells, supra note 303, at 792-98 (describing proposed

reforms to the allocation procedure under the U.S. Superfund law).
333. Id. at 792-97.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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The European Community should review the most

recently proposed amendments to the U.S. Superfund law and
adapt several of their proposals into the Proposed Directive.
One final recommendation is that the European Community
should be careful not to copy the settlement provisions in the U.S.
Superfund. The settlement provisions in Superfund encourage
potentially responsible parties to engage in a game of high stakes
poker. 3 37 A party that settles under Superfund is not vulnerable
to contribution suits by other potentially responsible parties.3 3 8
Theoretically, under Superfund a party that is only modestly
responsible for polluting a site (for example, one that contributed
only five percent of the chemicals dumped on a site), but refuses
to settle could end up paying one hundred percent of the costs of
cleaning up a site. The Directive contains no such provisions
regarding settlements.
In shaping the Proposed Directive, the European Community
has benefited considerably from examining the U.S. Superfund
experience. While Superfund continually evokes cries of injustice,
the Proposed Liability Directive is pervaded by fairness in its
provisions that limit the scope of liability, restrain its application
to prospective violations, and suggest efforts to apportion liability.
The Directive would significantly enhance the Community's
comprehensive waste strategy. It would implement the polluter
pays principle by holding the "producer" liable for the costs of
cleaning up contaminated sites. By placing these costs on those
primarily responsible, the Community will save taxpayers the cost
of cleanup. Significantly, the liability scheme will only be part of
a truly comprehensive policy.
The Community's Proposed
Liability Directive would complement the Transfrontier Shipment
Regulation.3 3 9 The latter, which requires recordkeeping and
imposes notification requirements, will make it easier to identify

336.

Id.

337

McCann, supra note 276, at 179-80.

The restricted use of joint and

several liability in the Proposed Directive will reduce "the threat of
disproportionate joint and several liability, in conjunction with a settlement policy
that cuts off contribution rights, to coerce settlements from deep-pocket
defendants, as Superfund" does. Id. It is worth noting that the EPA only adopted
this policy after attempting, though only briefly, a "fair share" apportionment
approach.

338. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(I(2). A "persons who has resolved its liability to
the United States or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement
shall not be liable for claims of contribution.. . ." Id.
339. See Council Directive 84/631, 1984 O.J. (L 326) 31, as amended by
Council Regulation 259/93, 1993 O.J. (L 30) 1.
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parties responsible for any shipment that runs afoul of the
directive.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Proposed Directive represents an opportunity to breathe
life into the polluter pays principle. Although this principle has
been mentioned in EC treaties, directives, programmes, and most
every other form of Community document, it has been dormant in
practice. The Proposed Directive would invigorate this principle
and provide a much needed check on the protectionism emerging
under the guise of the proximity principle. Moreover, adopting
the Proposed Liability Directive might prevent the ECJ from
undermining the fundamental tenets underlying the EC Treaty;
that is, the Directive would implement the polluter pays principle
and might stir the ECJ to realize that the Community's obsession
with the proximity principle has undermined its commitment to
the free movement of goods and the ideals of a European
Community, much less a European Union. If the leaders of the
Community allow the fear of creating their own Superfund defeat
the Proposed Directive, they will invite the member states to erect
barriers to trade under the guise of environmental protection.
The Community's recent legislation and judicial rulings
represent a noticeable step backward for the European common
market. The Community's obsession with the proximity principle,
which urges disposal of waste close to its source, has given rise to
a trend of environmental protectionism. The political branches of
the EC have adopted legislation that allows member states to
prevent the importation of waste from other states. Moreover, the
European Court of Justice has contorted its jurisprudence to
allow an environmental protection exception to the ideal of
These developments
securing the free movement of goods.
represent missteps for the European Community.

Adopting the Proposed Directive would allow the Community
to reset its compass. To reaffirm the common market and move
toward an ever closer union, a uniform, Community-wide liability
law is necessary. This law, undoubtedly, will be problematic.
Businesses will complain that it has driven them to bankruptcy;
environmentalists will cry that it is insufficient to secure the
quality of life that Europeans deserve. Nonetheless, the absence
of such a law is a greater problem. The harmful concentration of
landfills in Wallonia reveals the tragic result of a single European
market in which member states retain varying environmental
However, the knee-jerk response from both the
standards.
Community's legislative and judicial branches has also been
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deleterious. The Transfrontier Shipment Regulation 3 40 and the
Belgian Waste Case34 1 undermine the Community's commitment
to the free movement of goods by endorsing a system that urges
member states to be self-sufficient. This trend seems contrary to

the ideals of the European Community.
Such ideals should not be discarded so easily. The member
states of the Community will always have to deal with waste
issues.
For that reason, the creeping environmental
protectionism should be alarming, because instead of moving
toward an ever closer union, the member states seem to be
isolating themselves on an important issue.
Adopting the
Proposed Directive will not be a panacea, but it will represent a
step in the right direction.
Daniel W. Simcox

340.
341.

See discussion suprapart II.
See discussion suprapart InI.

